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I. INTRODUCTION
American history has witnessed recurrent conflict between the
judiciary and the executive or legislative branches of our govern-
ment.' The conflict generates heated passions perhaps because it
involves both significant struggles for power and fundamental
views about the rule of law. New opportunities for conflict have
arisen as the number of administrative agencies has grown. In the
last decade, administrative agencies2 and the courts have engaged
in a continuing controversy over whether agencies must follow
lower court precedents. Although the controversy has touched a
number of agencies at least peripherally, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB or Board) and the Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA) have figured most prominently in the battle. Both agen-
cies on occasion have announced explicitly their intention to
disregard judicial precedent, even in cases that arise within the
same judicial territory.3
The NLRB's actions have provoked repeated, angry outbursts
from the courts but little detailed analysis, on either a doctrinal or
a theoretical level.4 The SSA has drawn wider attention because
the agency's actions were part of a controversial program designed
to terminate the benefits of persons who were receiving Social Se-
curity disability payments. Several lawsuits explicitly challenged
1. Conflict between the judiciary and other departments of government often has cen-
tered around the obligation of the executive and the legislature to follow the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the Constitution. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21-29
(11th ed. 1985). Famous examples include Abraham Lincoln's opposition to the Dred Scott
decision and conflict over the Supreme Court's invalidation of New Deal economic regula-
tion, which led to President Roosevelt's Court packing plan of 1937.
2. The focus of this Article is administrative agency nonacquiescence at the federal
level. The problem appears to be widespread at the state level also. See Kelly & Rothen-
berg, The Use of Collateral Estoppel by a Private Party in Suits Against Public Agency
Defendants, 13 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 303 (1980).
3. See infra notes 15, 19, and 20.
4. See infra notes 549-52.
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the agency's nonacquiescence 5 in judicial precedent' The press at-
tacked the SSA's behavior, 7 which drew the predictable counterat-
tacks.' The attention drawn to nonacquiescence in this context,
however, has not produced a thorough understanding of the
problem.
This Article will analyze the phenomenon of administrative
agency nonacquiescence. Section II defines different types of non-
acquiescence, surveys current agency practices, and examines the
judicial response to various forms of nonacquiescence. Section III
identifies the causes of nonacquiescence and the effects of the
practice on litigants and agencies. Section IV analyzes four doctri-
nal approaches to nonacquiescence and demonstrates that the doc-
5. The term nonacquiescence is hardly a household word, even among lawyers. As sec-
tion II demonstrates, however, the practice is widespread. Nonacquiescence has not been
accorded much attention because the practice often operates without being labeled and
identified.
The term nonacquiescence apparently was coined by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) in the 1920's. At that time the Commissioner had one year to appeal adverse decisions
by the Board of Tax Appeals (the Board). As an accommodation to taxpayers, the IRS
developed the practice of issuing an announcement when the IRS did not intend to appeal
the Board's decision. This announcement, known as an "acquiescence," allowed the tax-
payer to treat the Board's decision as final without waiting for the full appeal period to run.
Conversely, announcement of the Commissioner's nonacquiescence in a case signaled an in-
tention to appeal. This rationale for nonacquiescence evaporated when the appeal period
was shortened, first to six and then to the current three months. The term nonacquiescence
did not disappear, however. The IRS retained the practice of announcing nonacquiescence
in Tax Court decisions as an informal system of precedent for IRS personnel as well as for
taxpayers. See Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity-A
View from Within, 43 TAXES 756, 773 (1965).
More recently other administrative agencies have adopted the term. Both the SSA and
the NLRB occasionally have refused to follow judicial precedent in rendering agency deci-
sions and have called their practice nonacquiescence. Only recently has the general com-
mentary on administrative law acknowledged the existence of the phenomenon of nonacqui-
escence. Compare J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
LAW SYSTEM 268 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as MASHAW & MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW] with J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM
(1975) (no mention of problem) [hereinafter cited as MASHAW & MERRILL, INTRODUCTION];
compare R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 413-17
(1985) (topic discussed and listed in index) with B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed.
1984) (no mention of nonacquiescence).
6. See infra note 54.
7. See, e.g., U.S. Flouts Courts in Determination of Benefit Claims, N.Y. Times, May
13, 1984, § 1 at 1, col. 1; Lewis, Respect for Law, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1984, at Y3, col. 1;
Lewis, Enough Was Enough, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1984, at Y25, col. 2.
8. See, e.g., Statement of Carolyn B. Kuhl, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, Department of Justice, Before the Senate Finance Committee (Jan. 25, 1984),
(concerning SSA's nonacquiescence policy), excerpted in Kuhl, The Social Security Admin-
istration's Nonacquiescence Policy, 1984 DET. C.L. REV. 913; Address by Paul Bator 61
A.L.I. PROC. 493 (1984) [hereinafter cited as BATOR].
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trines do not resolve the nonacquiescence problem because of un-
resolved fundamental underlying value conflicts between judicial
and agency perspectives. Section V then reviews four possible re-
sponses to nonacquiescence and the issues that litigants and deci-
sionmakers who face nonacquiescence must address. The Article
concludes that no permanent solution to the problem of nonacqui-
escence can be expected in light of the unresolved value choices
identified in section IV. Greater awareness and knowledge concern-
ing the problem, however, may lead to more desirable provisional
solutions.
II. AGENCY NONACQUIESCENCE PRACTICES AND THE JUDICIAL
RESPONSE
As used in this Article, the phrase "administrative agency non-
acquiescence" refers to an administrative agency's refusal to follow
judicial precedent when the agency handles cases that involve sim-
ilar issues.9 Nonacquiescence is distinguishable from agency reliti-
gation.10 Both practices involve the larger problem of the relation-
ship between administrative agencies and the judiciary, but they
are not identical. Nonacquiescence involves internal agency activ-
ity: to what extent will the agency follow judicial precedent in tak-
ing action at the agency level? Relitigation, on the other hand, in-
volves the agency's external behavior in litigation in which the
agency is a party: to what extent will the agency relitigate issues
9. Because nonacquiescence issues involve refusal to follow judicial precedent, those
issues will involve questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact, which typically are
questions of statutory interpretation.
10. Professor Vestal analyzed agency relitigation practices in Vestal, Relitigation by
Federal Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and Synthesis of Judicial Policies, 55 N.C.L. Rav.
122 (1977), but he did not refer explicitly to nonacquiescence. Several recent articles have
considered nonacquiescence. See Williams, The Social Security Administration's Policy of
Non-Acquiescence, 12 N. Ky. L. REv. 253 (1985); Comment, Administrative Agency In-
tracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 COLuM. L. Rav. 582, 583 & n.8 (1985) (distinguishing nonac-
quiescence from relitigation but focusing on the relationship of nonacquiescence to judicial
review of agency decisions) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence];
Comment, "Respectful Disagreement". Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agen-
cies in United States Courts of Appeals Precedents, 18 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBs. 463
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Respectful Disagreement]; Comment, Social Secur-
ity Continuing Disability Reviews and the Practice of Nonacquiescence, 16 Cus. L. REv.
111 (1985) [herinafter cited as Comment, Continuing Disability Reviews]; Note, Adminis-
trative Nonacquiescence in Judicial Decisions, 53 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 147 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Administrative Nonacquiescence]; Note, Denying the Precedential Effect
of Federal Circuit Court Decisions: Nonacquiescence by Administrative Agencies, 32
WAYNE L. Rav. 151 (1985). Some works tend to collapse nonacquiescence and relitigation,
see, e.g., Comment, Respectful Disagreement, supra at 473-83.
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that other courts previously have decided adversely to the
agency? 1
Administrative agencies may not appeal their own decisions.
To relitigate the underlying issue, therefore, an agency must
nonacquiesce, that is, refuse to follow judicial precedent in agency
decisionmaking. Because most agency decisions are not appealed,
the agency does not relitigate every issue in which it has nonac-
quiesced. Thus, the incidences of nonacquiescence and relitigation
are not identical. 12
An agency that decides not to follow judicial precedent must
make two preliminary decisions. First, should the agency publicize
its decision and, if so, how? Second, should the agency consider
itself bound by some, even if not all, judicial decisions with which
agency members disagree? Nonacquiescence may take a variety of
forms, depending on the two decisions that an agency makes.
Those choices in turn may affect the response of both litigants and
the courts to agency practices. The following discussion sets out
the approaches that federal agencies take to these problems and
the judicial responses to these approaches.
A. Announcing the Agency's Action
Current agency nonacquiescence practices run the gamut from
self-conscious, public assertions that the agency refuses to be
bound by particular judicial precedent to omission of relevant judi-
cial precedent from agency opinions.
1. Formal Nonacquiescence
The most visible form of agency nonacquiescence is an explicit
public statement that the agency intends to disregard a particular
11. An agency's refusal to implement the mandate of a court raises a third and differ-
ent set of problems. Such refusal is uncommon but not unknown. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ja-
maica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1980); Valdez v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 1203 (D.
Colo. 1983); H.R. REP. No. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (discussing Reagan Administra-
tion's dispute with the judiciary over constitutionality of Competition in Contracting Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-369).
12. In the SSA, for instance, claimants typically seek judicial review of approximately
4% of administrative law judge (ALJ) decisions after a hearing and 1% of initial decisions
by the agency, see MASHAW & MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 5, at 267; see also
J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY
HEARINGS AND APPEALS 125-30 (1978) [hereinafter cited as HEARINGS AND APPEALS]. During
the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) first decade, 5% of the agency's formal
orders were appealed to the courts. W. GRLLHORN & C. BysE, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 213-14
(1960), cited in MASHAW & MERRILL, AMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 5, at 267.
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judicial decision. This approach, often described as "formal nonac-
quiescence,"'" may be implemented in several ways. Two agencies,
the IRS 14 and the SSA,' 5 state in publications issued separately
from ongoing adjudicatory proceedings that they will not follow
certain judicial decisions. Other agencies, such as the NLRB,' e the
Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission, and, during
13. In Note, Administrative Nonacquiescence, supra note 10, the author distinguishes
formal and informal nonacquiescence. See id. at 152 n.36. The article does not address the
differing implications of the two forms of agency behavior. See also 1 Soc. SEC. COORD. 1
50,330 (RIA) (Feb. 15, 1984).
14. The IRS engages in formal nonacquiescence in courts of appeals decisions by issu-
ing revenue rulings. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112; Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 C.B.
278; Rev. Rul. 69-185, 1969-1 C.B. 108, 109; Rev. Rul. 69-162, 1969-1 C.B. 158. The IRS
maintains a List of Prime Issues indicating issues on which the IRS will continue to litigate
despite the existence of unfavorable judicial precedent. Because of the statutory provisions
for appeal from IRS determinations, the IRS is faced with precedents from the Tax Court in
addition to those from the district courts and courts of appeals. See infra note 73. The
relationship between the IRS and the Tax Court involves some of the issues discussed in
this Article. The IRS publishes announcements of acquiescence or nonacquiescence in Tax
Court decisions in its weekly Internal Revenue Service Bulletin, which is consolidated into
the Cumulative Bulletin twice a year. IRS nonacquiescence practices are discussed in Rod-
gers, The Commissioner "Does Not Acquiesce", 59 NB. L. REv. 1001 (1980); Comment, The
Commissioner's Nonacquiescence, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 550 (1967); Comment, Treasury De-
partment's Practice of Non-acquiescence to Court Decisions, 28 ALB. L. REv. 274 (1964); R.
PAUL & J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ch. 51 (1934); Taxation with Repre-
sentation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 672-73 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
15. In 1967 the SSA began publishing its formal nonacquiescence decisions as social
security rulings. Social Security rulings currently are published quarterly by the SSA and
are considered binding on the agency in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 422.408 (1985). The
SSA has published nonacquiescence rulings in ten cases, including: Soc. Sec. Rul. 68-48c
(nonacquiescing in Rasmussen v. Gardner, 374 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1967)); Soc. Sec. Rul. 77-
35c (nonacquiescing in Pleasantview Convalescent and Nursing Center, Inc. v. Weinberger,
565 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1976) (rescinded)); Soc. Sec. Rul. 80-10c (nonacquiescing in Johnson v.
Califano, 607 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1979)); Soc. Sec. Rul. 80-11c (concerning Levings v.
Califano, 604 F.2d 591 (8th Cir. 1979)); Soc. Sec. Rul. 81-1c (concerning Boyland v. Califano,
633 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1980)); Soc. Sec. Rul. 81-28c (on Hutcheson v. Califano, 638 F.2d 96
(9th Cir. 1981)); Soc. Sec. Rul. 82-10c (on Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir.
1981)); and Soc. Sec. Rul. 82-49c (on Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982)). The
frequency of formal SSA nonacquiescence has increased in recent years. Six of the nonac-
quiescence rulings were issued after 1978. See also Soc. Sec. Rul. 81-6, containing a general
statement that SSA need not show that a claimant's medical condition has improved before
terminating the claimant's benefits. This policy conflicted with numerous court decisions.
Three recent law review articles specifically address nonacquiescence by the SSA. Williams,
supra note 10; Comment, Continuing Disability Reviews, supra note 10; Comment, Nonac-
quiescence: Health and Human Services' Refusal to Follow Federal Court Precedent, 63
WASH. U.L.Q. 737 (1985); see also Case Comment, Administrative Law-Jurisdiction, class
action, injunctive relief, and nonacquiescence: Lopez v. Heckler, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1984), 7 W.
NEW ENG. L. REv. 277 (1984).
16. The NLRB's nonacquiescence practices are discussed in Marrson, The United
States Circuit and the NLRB: "Stare Decisis" Only Applies if the Agency Wins, 53 OKLA.
L.J. 2561 (1985).
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the 1950s and 1960s, the Tax Court,17 typically assert their inten-
tion to disregard judicial precedent when the issue arises in the
context of ongoing litigation. An agency may make such claims at
any stage of the litigation process. Faced with a party's claim that
judicial precedent controls, a hearing officer or an administrative
law judge (AU)'8 may assert that he or she is bound only by deci-
sions of the agency.' 9 In its adjudication opinions the agency itself
17. The Tax Court formerly was an administrative agency but Congress designated it
as an Article I court under legislation adopted in 1969. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat.
730 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1982)). The practical significance of this redesignation is
that, as a court of the United States, the Tax Court is not subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) (1982). On several occasions, the Tax Court as an ad-
ministrative agency expressly refused to follow decisions of the courts of appeals in cases
that later were subject to judicial review. See, e.g. Houston Farms Dev. Co., 15 T.C. 321
(1951), rev'd, 194 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1952) (two to one decision); Arthur L. Lawrence, 27
T.C. 713 (1957); Stern v. Comm'r, 242 F.2d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 1957) ("The Tax Court... in
the instant case, stated that it would follow its own prior decisions in spite of numerous
reversals of such holdings by the Courts of Appeal, specifically alluding to the decision of
this court in Tyson v. Commissioner . . . ."). The Tax Court's refusal to follow court of
appeals decisions was the subject of criticism, see, e.g., Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy:
Tax Court Rejection of Court of Appeals Precedents, 57 COLUM. L. Rv. 717 (1957), and the
Tax Court subsequently reversed itself. Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). Subject to limited exceptions, the Tax Court now
follows court of appeals decisions when applicable. See Comment, The Burgeoning Impact
of the Golsen Rule on the United States Tax Court, 29 U. KAN. L. REv. 235 (1981).
18. The NLRB, for instance, uses both ALJs and hearing officers. The bulk of the
work of the NLRB is divided into two categories: unfair labor practice cases under § 10 of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982), and representation cases
under § 9(b) and (c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b), (c). The investigation and hearing
process differs for the two categories. Unfair labor practice charges are filed with a regional
director of the NLRB. The regional director investigates the charge and either dismisses the
charges or files a complaint and notice of hearing. ALJs preside over the hearings and issue
a recommended decision, which is reversable by the Board on request of a party. Represen-
tation questions also are initiated by filing a petition with the regional office. If a formal
hearing is held after regional office investigation of the petition, however, a hearing officer
presides rather than an ALJ. Normally the hearing officer is an attorney or field examiner
employed in the regional office. The hearing officer analyzes the issues and evidence but
does not make a recommended decision. The petition ordinarily is decided by the regional
director, and only limited Board review is available at the request of the parties. Procedures
in other types of cases differ somewhat. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.1-.36 (1985).
19. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1978). The Fed-
eral-Mogul court reviewed a decision in which the ALJ had found that an employer violated
the NLRA by coercively interrogating certain employees. The AUJ refused to follow criteria
for evaluating coerciveness of employer questions that were set out in a Second Circuit case
and later adopted by the Fifth Circuit-the "Bourne rule". In a discussion with the em-
ployer's attorney, the ALJ made comments such as "I don't know that the Board has
adopted the rule in the Bourne case" and "I try cases for the Board, with all due deference
to the Fifth Circuit." Id. at 1251-52. See also Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied 444 U.S. 975 (1980). In Ithaca College, a regional director of the NLRB
had refused to follow the Second Circuit's earlier decision in Yeshiva University v. NLRB,
582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), which had held that University faculty members fell outside the
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may acknowledge the existence of contrary judicial authority, but
may assert that the judicial precedent does not bind the agency.20
coverage of the NLRA because faculty members fell within the Act's exclusion for supervi-
sory and managerial employees. An appeal of the Yeshiva case was then pending before the
Supreme Court. The regional director stated that he was "bound to follow and apply Board
rather than court precedent, at least until the Supreme Court speaks to the contrary or the
Board decides to acquiesce." 623 F.2d at 226. In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Marshall,
636 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1980), the AU held that an employer had committed "repeated" viola-
tions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976). In so
ruling the ALJ followed an interpretation of the Commission that "held that a violation was
'repeated' if the employer had previously been cited for a single substantially similar infrac-
tion." 636 F.2d at 33. The ALJ expressly declined to follow Third Circuit precedent, which
limited the definition of a "repeated" violation to situations that involved several violations
demonstrating "a flouting of OSHA standards." Id. In PPG Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d
817 (4th Cir. 1982), an employer objected to the results of a representation election on
grounds, inter alia, that an employee group allegedly acting as agent for the union engaged
in economic coercion. The hearing officer distinguished on the facts a case in which the
Fourth Circuit had defined union-employee group agency relationships. The hearing officer
went on to attack the merits of that precedent, however, suggesting in the process that the
Board was not bound by the court's decision and that a hearing officer was bound only by
the Board's decisions. Id. at 820 n.5.
20. As early as 1944, the NLRB explicitly refused to follow lower court precedent. In
In re Schmidt, 58 N.L.R.B. 1342 (1944), after finding that an employer committed unfair
labor practices, the Board awarded back pay to two employees who refused either to resign
their union membership or to accept a transfer. Earlier in NLRB v. Waples-Platter Co., 140
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1944), the court had reversed a back pay award in similar circumstances.
The Board in Schmidt refused to follow the appellate decision, stating "[iun the absence of a
final determination of the question by the Supreme Court, we adhere to our view in [the
earlier] case." 58 NLRB at 1344 n.3. The Board went on to say that "[w]e also note that the
opinion of Member Reilly herein construes the Board's failure to apply to the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. . . in the Waples-Platter case as tantamount to acquiescence
on our part in the view of that court with respect to the back-pay issue. We do not so view
the matter. Our determination to forego review by the Supreme Court in that case rested
upon administrative considerations having no relationship to the merits of the back-pay
issue." Id. at 1344-45.
In In re Insurance Agent's Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957), an employer charged
the union with refusal to bargain, constituting an unfair labor practice, because the union
sponsored a slowdown during the course of contract negotiations. The trial examiner dis-
missed the charges and relied in part on Textile Worker's Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409
(D.C. Cir. 1955), in which the court held that the Board may not find that a union violates
its obligation to bargain in good faith based on evidence that the union engages in unpro-
tected harassing tactics during the course of negotiations. The Board reversed the trial ex-
aminer, stating
[i]t has been the Board's consistent policy for itself to determine whether to acquiesce
in the contrary views of a circuit court of appeals or whether, with due deference to the
court's opinion, to adhere to its previous holding until the Supreme Court of the
United States has ruled otherwise.
119 N.L.R.B. at 773.
In Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979), after an AIJ recom-
mended on the basis of Third Circuit precedent that the board dismiss a union unfair labor
practice charge, the Board declined, both initially and again on remand, to follow the judi-
cial decision. The Board in Ithaca College, 244 N.L.R.B. 517 (1979), adhering to prior rul-
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2. Informal Nonacquiescence
In informal nonacquiescence, the agency does not draw atten-
tion to its practice by public announcement. Instead, the agency
either disregards judicial precedent 2 or attempts to identify fac-
tual distinctions.22 Consequently, informal nonacquiescence is
ings in four lines of cases, found that college faculty members were employees within the
meaning of the NLRA and declined to follow a contrary Second Circuit precedent, Yeshiva
Univ. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978). The Board stated: "With all due respect to the
view expressed by the Second Circuit, [the NLRB] will adhere to its position until the Su-
preme Court has ruled on the matter." 244 N.L.R.B. at 518 n.3.
In S&H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 659 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1981), the Commis-
sion cited the employer for failure to provide safety belts to employees. The citations were
issued under a general OSHA regulation that did not define the specific circumstances
under which safety equipment was required. The Fifth Circuit previously had held that the
regulations could be constitutionally applied only if the employer either failed to comply
with general industry practice or had actual notice that a hazard existed or that the regula-
tions required safety equipment under the circumstances. The Commission "respectfully de-
clined to follow" the Fifth Circuit's precedent, stating that "'an administrative agency
charged with the duty of formulating uniform and orderly national policy in adjudications is
not bound to acquiesce in the views of U.S. courts of appeals that conflict with those of the
agency."' 659 F.2d at 1278 (quoting OSHRC opinion at 15). Cf. Summa Corp., 265 N.L.R.B.
343 (1982), in which the Board denied the employer's motion for an order requiring the
regional director to transmit to the Board the full investigative record concerning objections
to a representation election covering Las Vegas employees. The Board adhered to the proce-
dure set out in agency regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.68-.69 (1985), which excluded witness
statements from the record, while noting court decisions taking a contrary view, including a
Ninth Circuit decision. The Board asserted that the full record was in fact before it in the
case under consideration.
21. See, e.g., Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 1980)
("Board did not even make a token mention of the congressional admonition"). On sum-
mary judgment entered without a published opinion, the Board found that the employer
hospital committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with a separate bargain-
ing unit of four stationary engineers. The case centered around differing interpretations of
1974 amendments to the NLRA, which expanded the Act's coverage to include hospital em-
ployees. The committee report on the NLRA amendments "cautioned the Board to give due
consideration to preventing the proliferation of bargaining units in the health care indus-
try." 621 F.2d at 861. The Seventh Circuit set aside the order and denied enforcement be-
cause the Board failed to consider the congressional intent of the amendment. In NLRB v.
West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978), the Seventh Circuit previously had
reversed a similar order of the Board on the ground that the NLRB applied its traditional
community of interest standard for determining the site of bargaining units without ade-
quately considering this "congressional admonition." Id. at 216. See also Kitchen Fresh, Inc.
v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1983) in which the Board, consistent with agency regula-
tions, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.68-.69 (1985), overruled employer objections to the conduct of a rep-
resentation hearing. The regional director's record of the investigation did not include the
affidavits collected from any of the parties, although judicial precedent indicated that affida-
vits of parties did constitute a part of the record. The employer failed to object to the
omission of the affidavits; therefore, the Board did not discuss its practice or refer to con-
trary judicial precedent.
22. The court in NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co., 494 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1974), remanded
the case to the Board for reconsideration of the remedy entered (bargaining order directed
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more difficult to identify than formal nonacquiescence. Only by ex-
haustively tracing the history of individual cases and issues can
one identify instances of agency failure to follow judicial prece-
dent. And even then it may be difficult to distinguish informal
nonacquiescence from oversight or incompetence, without review
of the litigants' briefs and information about internal agency deci-
sionmaking processes.
Nonetheless, informal nonacquiescence appears to be wide-
spread. Even those agencies that occasionally engage in formal
nonacquiescence use informal nonacquiescence mechanisms. In ad-
dition to issuing public nonacquiescence rulings concerning specific
cases, beginning in 1976 the SSA specifically instructed its ALJs
that judicial precedent should not be applied if it is inconsistent
with agency interpretations.23 The SSA has disregarded appellate
and district court precedents with some frequency 2 4 despite some
at the company) in light of intervening Supreme Court precedent, NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The Board stayed its remand decision until the court of appeals
decided another factually similar case that the appellate court categorized as one in which a
bargaining order was not a permissible remedy. The ALJ entered a remand decision that
criticized the second court of appeals decision at length and then reaffirmed the entry of a
bargaining order. The AIJ justified his decision on the ground that the case fell in the
category of cases in which bargaining orders still were permissible under the Supreme Court
precedent.
Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983), involved a taxi cab company
that withdrew recognition of and refused to bargain with a union representing taxi cab driv-
ers who leased cabs from the company. An AIJ found that the drivers were employees, not
independent contractors. The ALJ further determined that the facts of the case were not
materially different from the facts of a previous case in which the Board had found that cab
drivers were employees, Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. 1329 (1973). On appeal, however, the
D.C. Circuit disagreed, and held that cab drivers were independent contractors. The Board
in Yellow Taxi apparently had agreed with the AUJ's characterization of the facts and had
adopted the A.'s findings. See Yellow Taxi, 249 N.L.R.B. 265 (1980).
Shortly thereafter, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided another case involving
lessee taxi cab drivers and approved the Board's finding of employee status for the drivers.
See City Cab Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The Board in Yellow Taxi then
issued sua sponte a supplemental decision and order justifying its earlier decision on the
ground that the case before it was factually similar to City Cab and thus was distinguishable
from Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. 1329 (1973), rev'd sub nom. Seafarer's Int'l Union Local
777 v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
23. OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS HANDBOOK § 1-161 (1981). The SSA has since
modified its policy and now authorizes ALJs to follow judicial precedent in narrow circum-
stances. See infra notes 199 and 200.
24. See, e.g., Morrison v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (class action
challenging the SSA's refusal to follow specific judicial precedents, including Day v. Wein-
berger, 522 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1975), and Griffis v. Weinberger, 509 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.
1975)-SSA did not formally nonacquiesce in either decision). Mayburg v. Heckler, 574 F.
supp. 922 (D. Mass. 1983), modified sub nom., Mayburg v. Secretary of Health and Human
Servs., 740 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1984), was a class action challenging the SSA's adherence to its
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public suggestions to the contrary. 5 Similarly, an informal survey
interpretation of the statute limiting Medicare coverage to 150 days of inpatient hospital
days during any spell of illness. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(a)(1), (2) (1982). SSA interprets "spell
of illness" as continuing while an individual resides in a skilled nursing home, even if the
individual receives custodial as opposed to skilled nursing care. See Soc. Sec. Rul. 69-62,
(incorporating former Health Care Financing Administration Rule 79-28). According to
plaintiff's complaint nine federal district courts had ruled adversely to the agency on this
issue but there were no appeals. See also Adamson v. Heckler, No. 84-C-2024 (D. Colo. filed
Jan. 4, 1985) (action challenging agency's alleged informal nonacquiescence in Tenth Circuit
precedents specifying the weight accorded to a treating physician's report in deciding a
claim for disability benefits); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (class
action challenging SSA's policy of nonacquiescence, citing informal refusal to follow Second
Circuit precedents concerning the evaluation of pain in deciding claims for disability bene-
fits); Douglas v. Schweiker, 734 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1984) (individual appeal in which agency
apparently had disregarded Eighth Circuit precedent concerning burden of proof in disabil-
ity cases); Capitano v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 732 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1984)
(individual appeal in which agency failed to follow Second Circuit precedent concerning
conflicting claims to widow's benefits); Layton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1984) (indi-
vidual claim in which agency disregarded Eighth Circuit precedents concerning evaluation
of a disability claimant's subjective complaints of pain); Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp.
1004 (C.D. Minn. 1984) (class action challenging failure to abide by Eighth Circuit prece-
dents on evaluation of pain).
Both Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Ohio 1984), and Hyatt v. Heckler, 579
F. Supp. 985 (D.N.C. 1984), vacated and remanded, 757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1985), chal-
lenged the agency's refusal to follow precedents that allowed the agency to terminate disa-
bility benefits only on a showing that a disability recipient's condition had shown medical
improvement since the original claim for benefits was approved. The agency published So-
cial Security rulings of nonacquiescence in Ninth Circuit precedents that adopted this medi-
cal improvement standard but did not separately nonacquiesce in similar precedents from
other circuits.
25. In 1979, in the course of attacking lower court certification of class actions in law-
suits challenging SSA procedures for collection of overpayments of Social Security benefits,
the Solicitor General represented in his brief that the agency either would "appeal adverse
decisions or abide by them within the jurisdiction of the courts rendering them." Brief for
Appellant at 68-69, Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 699 (1979). Just four years later, in
the same litigation, the SSA failed to abide by this pledge. Yamasaki was a consolidated
appeal of two cases, Yamasaki, a class action representing SSA recipients in the District of
Hawaii, and Buffington v. Weinberger, Civ. No. 734-73C2 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd sub nom.
Elliott v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Califano v. Yarnasak, 442 U.S. 682 (1979), a nationwide class action filed in the Western
District of Washington. The Supreme Court held that in certain circumstances oral hearings
were required prior to recoupment of overpayments and remanded both cases to determine
what notice should be given to class members.
On remand, the agency insisted that claimants first file a written request for waiver of
recoupment, then file a written request for an oral hearing if the agency denied waiver of
recoupment based on the written record. The District Court of Hawaii entered an order that
required the agency to schedule oral hearings automatically whenever the agency would
deny the claimant's request to waive recoupment of an overpayment based on available
written information. The District Court order was affirmed in Yamasaki v. Schweiker, 680
F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1982), and the agency did not seek certiorari. The plaintiffs in Buffington
then moved for entry of judgment, and the agency sought to avoid automatic scheduling of
any hearings despite the earlier unappealed order in Yamasaki. The District Court, how-
ever, rejected the agency's attempt and the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed. Bufflngton v.
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of NLRB decisions and secondary literature locates a substantial
number of cases involving informal nonacquiescence.26
Other agencies that have no formal policy also engage in non-
acquiescence on an informal basis. A survey of agency relitigation
by the Administrative Conference of the United States found that
many agencies decide informally on a case-by-case basis whether to
follow judicial precedents or to continue relitigating issues decided
adversely to the agency.27 Apparently, many agencies have nonac-
quiesced on at least one occasion, for at least thirteen agencies en-
countered intercircuit conflicts in decisions that affected the
agency during the five years preceding the survey.28 In excess of
eighty conflicts were involved. 29 In each case the agency necessarily
encountered the question of how to resolve the issue addressed by
the conflicting judicial precedents.
3. Formality and the Judicial Response to Nonacquiescence
Neither judicial opinions nor scholarly commentary suggests
that the acceptability of nonacquiescence depends on whether the
agency formally announces its policy. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the court's reaction to nonacquiescence is influenced heavily
by the formal or informal nature of the agency's practice. Most
judicial statements on nonacquiescence are triggered by formal, in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence-explicit agency refusal to follow prece-
dents decided by the reviewing court.30 No doubt this occurs in
part because formal nonacquiescence is visible. The tone of the ju-
dicial comments, which usually evince indignation and outrage,
suggests, however, that the courts may be responding more to the
form of nonacquiescence than to the decision to nonacquiesce.31
Schweiker, Civ. No. 734-73C2 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 1982).
26. See, e.g., C. SUMMERS, REPORT ON LABOR LAW CASES IN THE FEDERAL APPELLATE
SYSTEM (1974), cited in COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 138 n.26 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as COMMISSION ON REVISION].
27. The survey was discussed by the COMMISSION ON REVISION, supra note 26, at 140-
43. The responses do not specify whether the cited instances involved intercircuit or in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence.
28. See COMMISSION ON REVISION, supra note 26, at 157-60.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1978); Allegheny
Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224 (2d
Cir. 1980), PPG Indus. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
v. Marshall, 636 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1980); Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983),
aff'd in part, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 583 (1984).
31. See, e.g., Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 227-29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444
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That is, formal nonacquiescence simply may be perceived as too
blatant a threat to judicial status.
Certain circumstances have triggered judicial responses to in-
formal nonacquiescence. For instance, the parties may attack di-
rectly the legality of agency nonacquiescence practices.32 A party
may seek to challenge on appeal an issue that it did not raise
before the agency. To justify its failure to exhaust administrative
remedies the agency may argue that exhaustion would have been
futile because of the agency's consistent refusal to follow prece-
dent.3 3 Moreover, the agency's appellate briefs may so slight the
court's own precedent as to draw a rebuke from the court.34 In
most situations, however, informal nonacquiescence evokes no
comment, perhaps because it simply goes unnoticed. 5
B. Intracircuit and Intercircuit Nonacquiescence
1. Agency Practices
In public statements, federal administrative agencies uni-
formly acknowledge that Supreme Court decisions are binding.
When agencies nonacquiesce in judicial precedent, therefore, they
refuse to follow lower court decisions. The agency has two choices
if it is unwilling to follow a lower court decision. First, the agency
can disregard the precedent in all cases, even those cases appeala-
ble to the court that issued the controversial precedent. This re-
fusal to follow the decisions of the reviewing appellate court is
called intracircuit nonacquiescence.36 Second, the agency can
choose to disregard only precedents in cases arising in other geo-
graphical areas. This intermediate approach has been labelled in-
tercircuit nonacquiescence
Most discussions of nonacquiescence concern agency refusal to
follow courts of appeals decisions rather than failure to abide by
U.S. 975 (1980).
32. See, e.g., Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Holden v. Heck-
ler, 584 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985 (D.N.C. 1984),
vacated and remanded, 757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1985).
33. See Kitchen Fresh, Inc. v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1983).
34. See Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980).
35. This view is consistent with the lack of attention paid to formal nonacquiescence
until recently.
36. See Comment, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, supra note 10, at 583-84.
37. Comment, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, supra note 10, discusses agency relitiga-
tion of issues in circuits other than the circuit that issues a precedent, implicitly assuming
that in those cases the agency follows court of appeals precedents within the circuit of issu-
ance. Id. at 583. That assumption need not be valid.
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district court precedents.3 8 Several reasons are apparent. Many
agencies' decisions are appealable directly to the courts of appeals
and not to the district courts.3 9 For those agencies, the problem of
nonacquiescence is limited to the question whether to follow court
of appeals precedents. In addition, district court decisions gener-
ally are not considered binding on other courts, and some district
courts do not publish many of their opinions.4 0 Nonetheless, .a
complete discussion of nonacquiescence must include agency re-
fusal to follow district court opinions. Such refusals have been
challenged when an agency is subject to repeated adverse district
court decisions on a particular issue, and the agency persistently
chooses not to appeal.41
The approximate incidence of formal intracircuit nonacquies-
cence is comparatively easy to determine because agencies gener-
ally publish rulings of nonacquiescence in advance of litigation
only in cases of intracircuit nonacquiescence.42 Similarly, agency
nonacquiescence statements that are issued in the course of agency
adjudication typically involve intracircuit nonacquiescence. 3
No doubt formal intercircuit nonacquiescence also takes place
in which agencies indicate during adjudicative proceedings that
they will not follow precedent from another circuit. Neither agen-
cies nor courts ordinarily label this practice nonacquiescence, how-
ever. Intercircuit nonacquiescence seems to be widely accepted,
perhaps because it is similar to the judicial practice of treating pre-
cedent from outside the circuit as having only persuasive value.
In analyzing informal nonacquiescence, distinguishing intercir-
cuit from intracircuit nonacquiescence presents difficulties. Discus-
sions of agency relitigation practices typically do not identify
whether an agency ignores or follows judicial precedent in cases
arising within a circuit while relitigating similar cases in other cir-
cuits.4 4 In addition, some agencies seem disinclined to acknowledge
38. See, e.g., Comment, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, supra note 10; Note, Adminis-
trative Non-acquiescence, supra note 10, at 583, see also supra text accompanying note 13.
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (NLRB); 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(c), 45(c) (Federal Trade Com-
mission); 26 U.S.C. § 7482 (Tax Court).
40. A computer search of the federal district court data base for opinions written by
Ninth Circuit district court judges revealed wide variation in the number of opinions writ-
ten by the judges over a comparable time period.
41. See Mayburg v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 922 (D. Mass. 1983).
42. See, e.g., supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text; see also Chee v. Schweiker,
563 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Ariz. 1983).
43. See cases cited supra notes 19 and 20.
44. See, e.g., Vestal, supra note 10; Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Cases:
A Field and Statistical Study, 11 Hous. L. REV. 1101, 1104 (1974).
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the extent of their nonacquiescence activity.45 At least within the
SSA, informal intracircuit nonacquiescence appears to be wide-
spread, judging from a spate of recent lawsuits challenging SSA
practices."
2. Judicial Reaction to Intracircuit Nonacquiescence
Not surprisingly, judicial decisions addressing the propriety of
nonacquiescence have focused primarily on intracircuit nonacqui-
escence. Most courts have not taken kindly to the disrespect for
authority reflected in an agency's refusal to follow the court's deci-
sions. The judicial opinions that have addressed intracircuit nonac-
quiescence47 span a period of thirty years and several agencies, but
most judicial activity in the nonacquiescence area has taken place
within the last decade. Three court of appeals decisions during the
mid-1950s addressed the Tax Court's refusal to follow the prece-
dents of the reviewing circuit court.48 After a lengthy hiatus, begin-
ning in the mid-1970s a series of cases arising out of the NLRB,49
45. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON REVISION, supra note 26. The report quoted the NLRB's
general counsel as saying, "[I]f a circuit has ruled against the Board and another case
presenting the same issue arises in that circuit, the Board will seek to distinguish the ad-
verse case on its facts. In the rare instances where that has not been possible, the Board has
acquiesced in the adverse decision." Id. at 140. The report also noted contrary cases.
46. See cases cited supra note 24.
47. Although most judicial opinions do not expressly distinguish intercircuit and in-
tracircuit nonacquiescence, this Article will use that terminology for the sake of clarity. The
term has crept into recent opinions. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
48. Stacey Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1956); Sullivan
v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1957), afl'd, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Stern v. Commis-
sioner, 242 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1957, aff'd, 357 U.S. 39 (1958).
49. Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Kitchen Fresh, Inc. v.
NLRB, 716 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1983); PPG Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 817 (4th Cir.
1982); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1980); Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v.
NLRB, 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir.
1979); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Gibson
Prods. Co., 494 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1974); see also NLRB v. Blackstone Co., 685 F.2d 102 (3d
Cir. 1982). In Blackstone after the agency issued its decision, the Third Circuit reached a
contrary result on the same issue in a different case. The issue was the burden of proof in
discharge cases (the Wright Line test). No such precedent was available at the time of the
Board's decision. At oral argument, however, counsel for the Board defended NLRB nonac-
quiescence and drew the following response in the court's opinion: "We consider the Board's
contrary instructions to its administrative law judges to be completely improper and reflec-
tive of a bureaucratic arrogance which will not be tolerated." Id. at 106 n.5.
In Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1983), the court was faced, not with
nonacquiescence per se, but with the Board's reluctance to follow the law of the case. In an
earlier appeal, the court found the record ambiguous and remanded to the Board for specific
findings by the regional director. The Board itself responded to the court's questions based
on the record the court considered ambiguous.
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the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,50 and the
SSA5' discussed intracircuit nonacquiescence.
The initial judicial response to intracircuit nonacquiescence
was uniformly negative, but involved limited analysis of the prob-
lem. Generally, the courts simply asserted that agencies are bound
to follow judicial precedents based either on notions of stare deci-
sis and the law of the circuit 2 or on conceptions of separation of
powers as set forth in Marbury v. Madison .5  More recently, how-
50. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1980); S&H Riggers
& Erectors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 659 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1981).
51. Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part, 724 F.2d 1489
(9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 583 (mem. 1984); Holden v. Heckler, 584 F.
Supp. 463 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985 (D.N.C. 1984), vacated and
remanded, 757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1985).
52. See Stacey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605, 606 (6th Cir. 1956) ("[T]he
Tax Court of the United States is not lawfully privileged to disregard and refuse to follow,
as the settled law of the circuit, an opinion of the court of appeals for that circuit."). The
court of appeals in Stacey noted that the Tax Court operated in a similar fashion to the
district courts that handle taxpayer suits for refunds and was equally bound by court of
appeals precedent. Id. at 606. See also Stern v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 322 (6th Cir.),
(quoting Stacey), aff'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 34 (1958); NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co.,
494 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1974) (Court stated that prior practice "is the law of this circuit
and is as binding on the Trial Examiner and the Board, however great their displeasure with
it, as it is on us."); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[O]ur
judgments. . . are binding on all inferior courts and litigants in the Third Judicial Circuit,
and also on administrative agencies. . . . [T]he Board is not a court nor is it equal to this
court in matters of statutory interpretations. Thus, a disagreement by the NLRB with a
decision of this court is simply an academic exercise that possesses no authoritative ef-
fect."); Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Such
flagrant disregard of judicial precedent must not continue. . . . [T]he Board [is] obligated
under the principles of stare decisis. . . ."); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d
Cir. 1980). The Ithaca College court addressed the Board's "nonacquiescence" and stated
emphatically that "[tihe position of the Board is one in which we cannot acquiesce." Id.
Noting the Board's "consistent practice of refusing to follow the law of the Circuit unless it
coincides with the Board's views," the court wrote, "[tihis is intolerable if the rule of law is
to prevail." Id. See also PPG Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 817, 820-21, 23 (4th Cir. 1982)
(Rejecting the hearing officer's "feeble attempt to distinguish" the court's prior case, the
court said, "[T]he Hearing Officer was obliged by law to recognize that [prior precedent]
was binding authority in the Fourth Circuit and as such he was not free to disregard it.");
Kitchen Fresh, Inc. v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 351, 357 n.12 (6th Cir. 1983) ("the Board is bound to
apply the law of the circuit in which a case arises"); Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 29
(C.D. Cal. 1983) (Plaintiffs "demonstrated probable success on the merits by making a
strong argument that agencies are bound by the laws of the circuit."), aff'd in part, 724 F.2d
1489 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 583 (mem. 1984).
53. See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979) (After citing
the provisions of the NLRA authorizing judicial review of agency decisions and Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), the court said, "[flor the Board to predicate an order
on its disagreement with this court's interpretation of a statute is for it to operate outside
the law."); Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985, 999 (D.N.C. 1984), vacated and remanded,
757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1985) (Under "the principle of separation of powers . . . federal
courts retain the ultimate authority to interpret the law."); Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp.
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ever, courts have faced direct challenges to the legality of agency
nonacquiescence and have ruled on requests for injunctive relief or
imposition of sanctions against the agency. The judicial response
has been ambiguous. 54 A series of direct challenges to nonacquies-
cence has been filed, 5  most involving the SSA,5" but the question
26, 29 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part, 724 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 105
S. Ct. 583 (mem. 1984).
54. See, e.g., Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court in
Yellow Taxi faced an employer's request for sanctions against the NLRB. The majority
criticized the Board for its disregard of precedent but stated that "the Board is not required
to conform its rulings to every decision by a Court of Appeals." Id. at 383. Judge MacKin-
non would have required adherence only to "firmly established" precedent. Id. In a concur-
ring opinion, Judge Skelly Wright approved nonacquiescence, suggesting that the agency
should be allowed to adhere to its position until Supreme Court review is obtained. Id. at
384-85. Judge Wright noted that S&H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 659 F.2d 1273,
1278-79 (5th Cir. 1981), was a case in which the court "assume[d] without deciding that the
Commission [was] free to decline to follow decisions of the Courts of Appeals with which it
disagree[d], even in cases arising in those circuits," id. at 1278, despite prior Fifth Circuit
decisions in which the court disapproved of NLRB refusal to follow judicial precedent. The
S&H Riggers court adhered to its prior views, however, and reversed on the merits of the
underlying question of statutory interpretation.
55. Recent challenges to nonacquiescence include two broad attacks on the legality of
nonacquiescence. Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983), (class action plaintiffs
sought and obtained preliminary injunction requiring SSA to abide by Ninth Circuit deci-
sion), aff'd in part, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 583 (mem.
1984); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (class action plaintiffs ob-
tained preliminary injunction requiring SSA to follow Second Circuit precedent). Other
cases attack nonacquiescence in the context of specific issues. E.g., Yellow Taxi Co. v.
NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (employer unsuccessfully sought order holding agency
personnel in contempt for its disregard of judicial precedent, or requiring the Board to pro-
mulgate prospective rules); Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (plaintiffs
sought and obtained injunction against the secretary's refusal to follow Sixth Circuit prece-
dent, which adopted a "medical improvement" standard for terminating disability recipi-
ents); Polaski v. Heckler, 588 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Minn. 1984) (class action plaintiff obtained
preliminary injunction requiring agency to follow Eighth Circuit precedents concerning eval-
uation of pain); Aldrich v. Schweiker, 555 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Vt. 1982) (court certified class
and denied motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in action challenging
the SSA's refusal to follow Second Circuit precedents that allegedly (1) required the agency
to follow the treating physician's opinion on disability unless the opinion was contradicted
by substantial evidence; (2) required SSA to give some weight to a determination by another
agency that the claimant was disabled; and (3) held that finding of disability was permissi-
ble based on claimant's subjective complaints, absent "objective evidence of an underlying
impairment"); Wheeler v. Schweiker, 547 F. Supp. 599 (D. Vt. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 719 F.2d 595 (2d. Cir. 1983). Wheeler was an action challenging the SSA's refusal to
apply a medical improvement standard in terminating grandfatherees. According to the
court, no Second Circuit precedent explicitly required a medical improvement standard.
The court refused to certify a class and rejected the medical improvement standard in part.
In Rivera v. Heckler, 568 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.J. 1983), the court certified a class and found
subject matter jurisdiction in an action challenging the Secretary's refusal to follow Third
Circuit precedents that (1) required the agency to give substantial weight to the opinion of a
treating physician when that opinion was not contradicted by substantial evidence, and (2)
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required the agency to consider the claimant's subjective complaints of pain in evaluating
disability. In evaluating plaintiffs' claim that mandamus jurisdiction was available under 28
U.S.C. § 1361 (1982), the court found "more than colorable" the plaintiffs' claim that fifth
amendment due process "requires the Secretary to follow controlling judicial precedent."
568 F. Supp. at 243.
56. Most of these SSA lawsuits grow out a politically controversial effort to cut back
on the social security rolls, and seem to stem partially from two formal nonacquiescence
rulings by the SSA. Thus, a brief review of the background of those rulings may be helpful.
In 1974, the SSA initiated a new federal program known as Supplemental Security Income
(SSI). Pub. L. No. 92-608, § 30, 86 Stat. 1465 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982)). The
uniform, federally funded SSI program was a needs-based welfare program for the aged,
blind, and disabled, which replaced separate, widely varying state administered and federal-
state funded programs covering the same categories of individuals. These federal-state pro-
grams were authorized under former Title XVI of the Social Security Act, previously codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1381. Recipients of state benefits were transferred automatically to the
new federal program under a process known as grandfathering. The transfer process was at
best chaotic. In 1978, the SSA began an experimental effort in the State of Washington to
review systematically the continuing eligibility of these grandfatherees. A high percentage of
recipients were terminated from the program, and a dispute arose between the agency and
claimants over the proper criteria under which grandfatherees' eligibility should be
determined.
In Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit considered
an appeal by a grandfathered individual whose benefits were terminated on the ground that
he was not disabled according to the current federal definition of disability. The claimant
argued that disability must be evaluated under the previous state standard for the Title
XVI program. The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that a grandfatheree could not be termi-
nated from the program absent proof of a material improvement in the person's medical
condition or a clear and specific error in the prior state determination awarding benefits. Id.
at 1347. The SSA did not request certiorari but instead published a notice of nonacquies-
cence in the Ninth Circuit's opinion. Soc. Sec. Rul. 82-10c.
One year later the Ninth Circuit faced a similar issue in Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d
582 (9th Cir. 1982). The case arose in the context of the SSA's Title II disability program
for workers who had paid into the Social Security retirement system. See 42 U.S.C. § 401
(1982). The SSA had terminated Juanita Patti's disability benefits on the ground that she
was no longer disabled after undergoing a lumbar laminectomy. An ALJ reversed the deci-
sion. One year later the SSA again terminated Ms. Patti's benefits. The evidence showed no
improvement in Ms. Patti's condition since the first hearing decision. Nonetheless, after a
hearing on the second termination an AUJ upheld the decision. On appeal the Ninth Circuit
reversed and held that a prior ruling of disability as to a non-grandfathered SSI recipient
gives rise to a presumption that the disabling condition remains unchanged. The SSA then
bears the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. Again the SSA
did not request certiorari but instead published its notice of nonacquiescence. Most other
circuits followed the decisions in Finnegan and Patti that adopted a "medical improve-
ment" standard for termination of SSI and SSA benefits. These decisions took on considera-
ble significance as the SSA implemented its Continuing Disability Investigation (CDI) re-
views, a congressionally mandated program that reviewed the eligibility of recipients of
social security disability benefits. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-265, 95 Stat. 441 (1980). The Reagan Administration implemented these reviews on
an accelerated basis, anticipating substantial cost savings. As a result large numbers of re-
cipients were terminated. Numerous lawsuits were filed challenging aspects of the review
process, including several class actions that explicitly challenged the SSA's refusal to follow
judicial precedent. For background on the controversy surrounding the attempts to cut back
on social security disability benefits, see SENATE SUcoOM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV'T MANAGE-
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has not been definitively resolved.5 7
3. Responses to Intercircuit Nonacquiescence
The courts rarely comment on intercircuit nonacquiescence.
To a large extent, the structure of American appellate courts ap-
pears to approve of and even demand intercircuit nonacquiescence
in cases in which the agency desires Supreme Court review of an
issue.58 Certainly, participants in the American legal system have
become accustomed to differences in the law applied by different
circuits. Persistent intercircuit nonacquiescence and relitigation or
even interdistrict nonacquiescence and relitigation, however, occa-
sionally have drawn adverse comment by the courts, particularly
when the pattern seems to be part of an agency effort to continue
challenged practices without judicial review. 9
III. NONACQUIESCENCE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
Administrative agencies refuse to follow judicial precedent for
various reasons, many of which are endemic to the American legal
and political systems. Thus, nonacquiescence may prove difficult to
eradicate. Yet the consequences of nonacquiescence are sufficiently
serious that litigants can be expected to challenge the practice, and
decisionmakers may wish to limit the practice. An understanding
of the causes and consequences of nonacquiescence, therefore, may
help to illuminate the advantages and disadvantages of available
responses.
A. Why Agencies Engage in Nonacquiescence
Administrative agencies presumably engage in nonacquies-
cence because agency personnel disagree with the results of judicial
decisions and are unwilling to abandon the agency's position in
favor of the court's approach to the problem. But that unobjection-
MENT, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS. OVERSIGHT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. DISABILITY RE-
viaws(Comm. Print. 1982). A good example of press response to the problem may be found
in Wyrick & Owens, The Disability Nightmare, Newsday, March 20-22, 1983, at 6.
57. See cases cited supra note 55; see also infra note 184; infra notes 199-200 agency
responses.
58. See, e.g., Sup. CT. R. 17(a) (specifying consideration governing review and
certiorari).
59. See, e.g., Mayburg v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 922 (D. Mass. 1983) (defining class to
include persons who will meet class definitions in the future is appropriate because other-
wise Department of Health and Human Services will "persist in [its] course of conduct de-
spite repeated adjudications that it is contrary to law."), modified sub nom. Mayburg v.
Secretary of Health and Human Servs. 740 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1984).
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able statement says very little. After all, agencies sometimes do fol-
low judicial precedent. What influences the decision to nonac-
quiesce? Most agency nonacquiescence decisions appear to result
from an amalgam of factors ranging from politics to bureaucratic
inertia to institutional structures.6 0
1. The Political Factor
American administrative agencies oversee statutes that dele-
gate complex functions involving important value choices. Conse-
quently, agency decisions can affect the distribution of power in
American society significantly. When an agency decides whether to
follow judicial precedent or to adhere to the agency's own interpre-
tation of a statute, agency personnel may be strongly influenced by
their own views on the merits of the underlying issue. In addition,
administrative agencies often are subject to intense political pres-
sures-from Congress, the executive branch, the press, and the
public. There are two ways in which outside political pressures
may encourage an agency to nonacquiesce. Influential members of
the agency's constituency or overseers may care deeply about the
underlying issue triggering the court-agency dispute and may com-
municate these feelings to the agency. Alternatively, the agency
may be under pressure to accomplish broader goals that seem in-
compatible with agency adherence to a given judicial precedent.
The NLRB nonacquiescence cases often have appeared to in-
volve statutory interpretation questions influenced by fundamental
political disagreements between pro-union agency members and
management-oriented courts over the desirability of unionization
efforts. In these disputes, agency members no doubt are influenced
both by their own views and the views of outsiders because agency
members are political appointees subject to political scrutiny. 1
By contrast, the recent series of SSA nonacquiescence cases
appears to stem only peripherally from strong agency views con-
cerning the underlying issue itself.62 Compliance with judicial
precedents seemed inconsistent with agency attempts to reduce
growth in expenditures for disability benefits. The goal of budget
reduction stemmed from both congressional pressure over a period
of years and executive branch efforts under the Reagan Adminis-
60. The following discussion is not based on an empirical study of agency decision-
making. Such a study might yield important insights into the importance of the factors
discussed below.
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
62. See cases cited supra note 56.
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tration to cut the portion of the federal budget that finances social
programs.6
2. The Bureaucracy Factor
Federal administrative agencies are large bureaucratic organi-
zations. Two common characteristics of bureaucratic decisionmak-
ing may help explain why agencies engage in nonacquiescence."
First, decisionmaking in bureaucratic organizations ordinarily is
dispersed among numerous individuals. 5 Obtaining any decision
from the agency thus can necessitate overcoming considerable bu-
reaucratic inertia.6  Because the agency often must affirmatively
change its policy if it decides to follow judicial precedent, de facto
nonacquiescence may be the easiest course for agency personnel.
Second, a territorial imperative may characterize bureaucratic or-
ganizations. Participants in the bureaucracy tend to define the
agency's function in such a way that power and resources accrue to
the agency.6 7 Under this view, internal factors in the agency struc-
ture may discourage agency personnel from conceding ultimate
decisionmaking authority to the courts.
3. Factors Relating to Institutional Structure
A variety of factors relating either to internal agency struc-
ture, the organization of the American judicial system, or the rela-
tionship between the two, may deter an agency from following ju-
dicial precedent.
63. See supra note 56; see also J. MASHAW. BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983); Maranville,
Book Review, 69 MINN. L. REV. 325 (1984).
64. The bureaucratic character of federal agencies is universally shared. The factors
mentioned here, therefore, cannot explain why agencies nonacquiesce in some precedents
but not in others.
65. If decisionmaking authority in a large organization is central rather than dis-
persed, the decisionmaker may have insufficient time to attend to all issues requiring a deci-
sion. Thus, bureaucratic nonacquiescence may develop, but for different reasons.
66. An interesting illustration of this phenomenon in another context has occurred
recently in the SSA. The SSA published new regulations defining mental disability on Au-
gust 28, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 35038 (1985), largely in response to injunctive relief entered in
lawsuits that successfully challenged existing practices as unduly restrictive. See, e.g.,
Mental Health Ass'n v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983). Upon publication of the new
regulations, hearings in all mental disability cases currently pending before ALJs were
stayed, and the cases were returned to the initial claims proceeding stage, despite the pre-
sumptive intention of the courts enjoining prior SSA practices that the new regulations
would increase the number of cases in which the disability claim was approved. Soc. Sec.
teletype (Region X).




a. Information Transmittal and the Combination of Functions
Administrative agencies can follow judicial precedents only if
agency personnel are aware of the precedents and know how to im-
plement them. Yet federal administrative agencies typically per-
form a combination of functions, including formal adjudication, in-
formal investigation, enforcement activities, and claims processing.
Many of the personnel who are hired to perform these functions
have no formal legal training.6 8 Thus, these agency personnel real-
istically can follow judicial precedent only if someone within the
agency gives them appropriate instructions. To the extent that the
agency is subject to different precedents in offices that are within
the geographic territory of different courts, the process of trans-
mitting instructions may be complex, costly, time consuming, and
subject to a time lag between issuance of the court decision and
implementation of acquiescence instructions.
b. Uniformity and Precedents by the Hundreds
Even an agency staffed by competent, legally trained person-
nel may be disinclined or effectively unable to follow judicial
precedents if the volume of binding decisions is excessive. For
smaller agencies, the volume of judicial precedents is not a con-
cern. For the larger agencies such as the SSA, whose decisions are
reviewable in the district courts, the volume of potential court
precedents is staggering.70 As a result, high level agency deci-
sionmakers may have difficulty in keeping track of all potentially
significant litigation. If the agency has insufficient resources to liti-
gate each case fully, some potentially significant cases will be de-
cided without an adequate evidentiary record or thorough brief-
ing.7 1 In addition, agency personnel simply may have difficulty in
68. This is particularly true of agencies like the SSA that distribute benefits.
69. Cf. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1685, 1700-01, 1704-61 (1976).
70. The volume of appeals from decisions of the SSA has been increasing. From 1970
through 1975, the federal courts decided 11,927 appeals from decisions of the SSA. See
HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 12, at 129. In 1982 almost 13,000 cases involving disabil-
ity claims were appealed to the district courts. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 429
(1983). Recent Social Security appeals seem to involve more sophisticated issues of statu-
tory interpretation rather than simple challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. This
may reflect increased specialization and the development of a Social Security plaintiffs' bar
through the creation of the National Organization of Social Security Claimants' Representa-
tives (NOSSCR).
71. The SSA apparently did not track closely the case of Finnegan v. Matthews, 641
F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981). See infra note 80. When a class action was filed later on the same
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identifying applicable precedents promptly and accurately.72
c. Venue Problems
Agencies such as the NLRB, the IRS, and the FTC encounter
a special problem in following judicial precedents. These agencies
are subject to venue provisions that give adversely affected parties
a choice of courts in which to seek review. 73 In such cases, the
agency legitimately may be uncertain about which court's prece-
dents control.
B. Focusing the Problem: Why Nonacquiescence Matters
Administrative agency nonacquiescence has important effects,
both on litigants and on the process of decisionmaking in the
American governmental system. Before defining the phenomenon
as a problem-or a nonproblem-a survey of those effects is
appropriate.
1. Effects of Nonacquiescence on Litigants
Nonacquiescence matters to litigants for the reasons that any
procedure, including choice of decisionmaker, matters to litigants.
The procedures chosen-who decides and how-potentially affect
issue the agency did not add measurably to the record before the court. Siedlecki v.
Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
72. In 1980 and 1981, I observed this problem in local offices of the State Department
of Social and Health Services. In response to state fiscal difficulties, the state agency imple-
mented a series of program changes that restricted the availability of welfare programs.
Many of these changes were challenged in court, sometimes successfully, sometimes with
differing results at the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction stages. The
result was a rapid series of conflicting instructions, and line workers often encountered diffi-
culty in keeping abreast of those changes.
73. Any circuit in which the challenged unfair labor practice occurred or in which the
person affected by the Board's order resides or does business may review NLRB decisions.
See 24 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1982). The resulting forum shopping problems are discussed in
Comment, Forum Shopping in the Review of NLRB Orders, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 552 (1961). A
taxpayer who disagrees with the IRS' assessment of a tax currently has three options. The
taxpayer may pay the tax and sue for a refund in the district court in which the taxpayer
resides, I.R.C. § 7422 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(i) (1982), and then follow normal appeal
procedures. The taxpayer also may seek a refund from the United States Claims Court, 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (1982), in which case appeal lies to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). Alternatively, the taxpayer may refuse to pay the tax and
may file a petition for review in the Tax Court, I.R.C. §§ 6213, 7441 (1982), with appeal to
the court of appeals for the circuit in which the taxpayer resides, I.R.C. § 7482(b) (1982).
Decisions of the Federal Trade Commission are reviewable in the circuit in which the chal-
lenged practice occurred, or where the affected party resides or does business. 15 U.S.C. §§
21(c), 43(c) (1982).
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the ultimate outcomes. Procedure becomes substance. Nonacquies-
cence can delay a decision favorable to a litigant by months or
even years, which can result in increased costs to the litigant and
perceived uncertainty of outcome. In many cases, these procedural
effects, as a practical matter, determine the identity of the last
decisionmaker because litigants are discouraged from appealing
agency decisions.7 4 To the extent that the characteristics of agen-
cies and judicial decisionmakers differ in significant ways-class
backgrounds, professional training, and participation in discourse
systems embedded with differing values-the choice of deci-
sionmaker will influence substantive outcomes.
Nonacquiescence arises when an agency refuses to abide by a
court-imposed obligation. Administrative agency nonacquiescence,
therefore, will disfavor those individuals who would benefit from
that obligation. Depending on the structure of the agency, how-
ever, other private parties may benefit from nonacquiescence. For
example, in most SSA cases, agency nonacquiescence has a consis-
tent and predictable effect: agency refusal to follow judicial prece-
dent means that recipients are denied benefits at a higher rate.
This effect comes about because most social security cases involve
only one party apart from the agency.7 1 If the agency's position
favors claimants, then the claimant will not seek judicial review.
Only when the agency position leads to denial of benefits will the
claimant appeal. Thus, no opportunity arises for nonacquiescence
that favors the individual claimant.
The typical agency regulatory process, by contrast, involves
multiple parties.76 The typical NLRB case, for instance, will in-
volve management, the union, and perhaps an individual worker,
all with opposing interests.7 In these cases, any agency decision
74. A small percentage of agency decisions undergo judicial review, even in the ab-
sence of delays creating disincentives to appeal. See supra note 12.
75. The SSA handles two major types of cases: claims for disability benefits under 42
U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982) or 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383, (1982) and claims for old age retirement
benefits under the same provisions. In these cases the SSA's decision to grant or deny a
claim has no direct effect on anyone except the claimant. A much smaller number of cases
involves claims for dependents' benefits by children and past or present spouses. Approval
of benefits for one dependent can reduce the amount available for another dependent be-
cause of a maximum amount payable in dependents' benefits. Similarly, a determination
that one person was validly married to a wage earner at the time of death or disability may
preclude payment of benefits to an individual who therefore was not legally married to the
wage earner.
76. Rulemaking, health and safety regulation, consumer protection regulation, and on
occasion, licensing, typically will all involve opposing interests.
77. See supra note 18.
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may be subject to judicial review and the substantive effects of
nonacquiescence are much more indeterminate. Nonacquiescence
will not favor one side to a dispute consistently unless, over time,
the agencies and the courts demonstrate consistently different po-
litical biases.
2. Effects on Agencies of Acquiescence in Judicial Precedent
Nonacquiescence allows administrative agencies to limit
sharply the effects of judicial review on ongoing agency business.
Restrictions on nonacquiescence thus would force agencies to re-
spond to judicial precedent by altering their behavior or by seeking
approval for the agency position from either the Supreme Court or
Congress.
An agency can, of course, abandon its preferred approach to a
problem each time a court adopts a different position. In effect,
this system would enforce a first-in-time rule for following judicial
precedent. Such an approach potentially hampers an agency's abil-
ity to regulate comprehensively and subjects the agency to the dic-
tates of any federal judge, no matter how idiosyncratic or ill-in-
formed.71 By acquiescing in judicial precedent only within the
circuit (or district) of issuance, the agency can limit substantially
the effects of judicial review on agency practice. That approach,
however, might undermine national uniformity and, at its extreme,
might prevent an agency from administering a uniform national
program.79
These potential disadvantages of requiring agencies to follow
precedent assume, of course, that the agency has no remedies when
following precedent would create serious problems. To the extent
that the concerns identified above operate in a particular situation,
the agency can seek Supreme Court review of lower court prece-
dents.80 The agency can pursue that option only at a certain cost,
78. The force of these concerns depends on the observer's view of the relative quality
of decisionmaking by agencies and the judiciary. Recent books attacking judicial decision-
making in cases involving administrative agencies include J. MASHAW, supra note 63, and R.
MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983).
79. The need for national uniformity often is cited as a justification for federal as-
sumption of regulatory or grant distribution programs. Thus, proponents of nonacquies-
cence argue that requiring agencies to follow judicial precedent would undermine this im-
portant goal. Note, however, that some lack of uniformity may already exist because of the
need to delegate decisionmaking to regional offices and front line personnel.
80. Obtaining Supreme Court review can be a time consuming process. Thus, the
agency still faces the question whether compliance with precedent is required pending re-
view. At least one court has suggested that intracircuit nonacquiescence is impermissible
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however. An agency that engages in nonacquiescence need not
monitor lower court litigation as closely; nor must the agency con-
cern itself in each case with ensuring an adequate record for Su-
preme Court review."1 Additionally, the agency can wait for a fac-
tual situation favorable to the agency before seeking Supreme
Court review on a particular issue.82 Finally, an agency that en-
gages in nonacquiescence has correspondingly less concern over the
Solicitor General's control of the flow of litigation to the Supreme
Court.8 3 An agency that is required to follow judicial precedent will
lose these advantages, although limits on intracircuit nonacquies-
cence will create fewer costs to the agency in these areas than lim-
its on intercircuit nonacquiescence.
In addition, the agency can resort to Congress for sympathetic
resolution of the underlying issues. The congressional option also
has costs to the agency involving time and expenditure of the
agency's political capital, which may limit the agency's ability to
obtain other statutory changes.
3. Effects on the Balance of Powers
The effects of nonacquiescence are not limited to litigants
before administrative agencies. By engaging in nonacquiescence,
administrative agencies arrogate power that the judiciary otherwise
would exercise. As an agency becomes less susceptible to judicial
control, it may acquire greater ability to engage in comprehensive
regulation without the disruptive influence of judicial review.8 4
pending Supreme Court review. See Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1980).
The court noted that the agency could stay proceedings in later cases pending the outcome
of the cases before the Supreme Court. Id. at 228; cf. Comment, Intracircuit Nonacquies-
cence, supra note 10, at 606-07.
81. In recent years the SSA occasionally has employed students just out of their first
year of law school to handle most of the briefing work on "routine" appeals from agency
decisions. Some federal agencies are notoriously slow in their handling of litigation. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 587 F. Supp. 1117 (D.D.C. 1984).
82. See, e.g., Memorandum of Sandy Crank, Associate Commissioner for Operational
Policy and Procedures for the Social Security Administration, to Donald A. Goya, Assistant
General Counsel (Sept. 14, 1981) (recommending that the SSA not petition for certiorari in
Finnegan v. Matthews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981), and instead issue a ruling of nonacqui-
escence). The recommendation noted that "it is questionable whether Finnegan is in fact
not disabled at this time" and suggested that the SSA could "attempt to argue this issue
[whether SSA must show that a claimant's medical condition has improved before terminat-
ing benefits] again before the courts in a case in which the plaintiff is clearly not disabled,"
when preparation and other factual conditions were more favorable.
83. See Comment, The Solicitor General and Intergovernmental Conflict, 76 MICH. L.
REv. 324 (1977).
84. See supra note 78 for authorities arguing that judicial review interferes with ra-
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Agency decisionmaking processes, typically characterized by utili-
tarian reasoning such as cost benefit analysis, may displace more
legalistic, rights-based forms of decisionmaking. The practice of
nonacquiescence also may have broader symbolic significance. As
agencies consciously and visibly engage in nonacquiescence, agency
personnel have less reason to internalize the values associated with
the rule of law, such as consistency, fairness to individuals, and
respect for the judiciary. This redistribution of power may cause
either suspicion or alarm, depending on the observer's point of
view concerning the political bent of agencies and the judiciary and
the desirability of the decisionmaking processes that characterize
the different institutions 5
Both administrative agencies and the federal judiciary are
substantially insulated from popular control, but they operate in a
checks and balances relationship with other institutions in the gov-
ernmental process. Thus, nonacquiescence may have additional ef-
fects on substantive decisionmaking to the extent that other insti-
tutions respond to the practice. One can expect that litigants faced
with agency decisionmaking insulated from judicial review will
seek recourse through the press and Congress. By highlighting the
existence of an impasse between the agency and the judiciary, non-
acquiescence may focus the attention of the press, the public, and
Congress on the problem, and may bring to the surface important
unresolved political conflicts."6 This process may result in wider
discussion of issues by a broader range of interested parties. Again,
the desirability of such effects will depend on the observer's regard
for the decisionmaking characteristics of the institution-this time
Congress.87 Politicizing the underlying substantive issues will disfa-
vor those who lack the financial resources and knowledge to par-
ticipate successfully in the legislative process.
The effects of nonacquiescence on the balance of power would
not end there. Politicizing the process may have effects on public
perception of agencies and courts. To the extent that all issues are
tional agency regulation.
85. Compare, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) with T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND
REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979) and Parker, The Past of Constitutional The-
ory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 240-46 (1981).
86. See Maranville, Book Review, 69 MINN. L. REV. 325 (1984).
87. The traditional view of democracy supports shifting to Congress the responsibility
for deciding controversial issues. For critiques of the traditional view and of congressional
decisionmaking processes, see MASHAW & MERRILL, INTRODUCTION supra note 5, at 24-31;
Parker, supra note 85.
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seen as political, litigants may abandon any belief that issues can
be resolved in the courts on neutral grounds, and simultaneously
may jettison any commitment to the rule of law. Conversely, the
legitimacy of bureaucratic action might well be undermined to the
extent that administrative action seems "lawless." One can expect
that each adjustment in this balance of power will bring forth com-
plex and often unpredictable countermoves.
IV. VALUE CONFLICTS AND THE LIMITS OF DOCTRINAL APPROACHES
TO NONACQUIESCENCE
In responding to administrative agency nonacquiescence, the
courts have relied primarily on separation of powers principles and
stare decisis concerns as embodied in the controlling nature of "the
law of the circuit."88 Additional doctrinal approaches to the prob-
lem, however, are also available. Nonacquiescence can be analyzed
in terms of four different legal doctrines: stare decisis and its spe-
cific applications, known as the controlling case doctrine or the law
of the circuit; issue preclusion; due process; and separation of pow-
ers concerns as developed in institutional competence analysis.8 9
None of these four doctrines provides a satisfactory response to
nonacquiescence, however, because each doctrine applies only to a
limited aspect of the nonacquiescence problem, and each doctrine
can provide a resolution to the problem only after the deci-
sionmaker chooses between judicial and agency perspectives on the
problem.
A. Stare Decisis, Controlling Case Doctrine, and the Law of
the Circuit
The most common judicial response to nonacquiescence is a
statement that administrative agencies are bound by the law of the
88. See cases discussed supra notes 52, 53.
89. One can raise an additional technical argument concerning some forms of nonac-
quiescence. Arguably, an explicit policy of nonacquiescence constitutes "an agency state-
ment of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, inter-
pret, or prescribe law or policy" under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(1982), which must be published in the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 553
(b) (1982). See Mattson, The United States Circuit Courts And The NLRB: 'Stare Decisis'
Only Applies If The Agency Wins, 53 OKLA. B.J. 2561 (1982). That argument implicates the
very messy line of cases exemplified by NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
Because this argument does not address the merits of nonacquiescence itself but would al-
low the practice if the agency complied with notice and comment requirements, it is not
included in the text.
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circuit.90 Implicit in this statement is the assumption that stare de-
cisis applies to administrative agencies. That basic assumption re-
quires additional assumptions about courts, administrative agen-
cies, and the concept of stare decisis. This section will examine
those assumptions.
Stare decisis refers to the rule that a court ordinarily follows
an earlier decision by the same court or a higher tribunal in a case
that requires interpretation of the same legal point or the applica-
tion of law to similar facts.91 The application of stare decisis to
relationships among courts at different levels of the hierarchy nor-
mally is governed by a particular branch of stare decisis sometimes
called the controlling case doctrine.92 The controlling case doctrine
requires the courts of a particular jurisdiction to follow precedents
from appellate courts within the same jurisdiction.
If administrative agencies are treated as lower courts within
the judicial hierarchy, the courts can bind agencies by stare decisis
and the controlling case doctrine. Four questions must be an-
swered, however. First, should agencies ever be treated as courts
for purposes of the controlling case doctrine? Second, under what
circumstances are a particular court's decisions considered control-
ling cases that bind the agency? Third, do agencies occupy a posi-
tion at the bottom level of the judicial hierarchy? Fourth, which
agency personnel should be treated as judges and thus bound by
controlling case doctrines? Each of these questions justifiably can
be answered differently depending on which aspect of the agencies'
functions and structures are emphasized.
1. Agencies as Courts
Stare decisis is a common-law doctrine. Neither constitutional
provisions nor statutes require adherence to prior decisions.
Rather, prior decisions are binding because, in a tautological fash-
ion, we deem them so. As one study of the doctrine quipped:
"Courts are absolutely bound by their own decisions because this
has been stated in other cases which are assumed to be absolutely
binding. 9 3 The controlling case doctrine is derived from the com-
90. See cases discussed supra note 52.
91. For an entree into the extensive literature on stare decisis, see University of
Southern California Law Center, Asa V. Call, Law Library Bibliography Series No. 83, Stare
Decisis and the Doctrine of Legal Precedent: A Selected Bibliography.
92. See generally Vestal, supra note 10.




mon law almost as a matter of definition. The higher courts in the
judicial hierarchy are "higher" courts in two ways. The decision of
a higher court overrides that of the lower court in a specific case,
as it must if the notion of an appeal has any practical value. Be-
yond the individual case, the decision of the higher court controls
the lower court as part of a common-law system of precedent.
The controlling case doctrine does not a priori9 4 apply to ad-
ministrative agencies. The doctrine developed to define relation-
ships among courts in a common-law judicial system. Under a for-
malistic analysis, if agencies are not courts, then by definition
agencies are not subject to the controlling case doctrine.
Under a functional analysis, however, the controlling case doc-
trine might apply to agencies to the extent that agencies perform
essentially the same functions as courts. Administrative agencies
function like courts in many respects. They engage in quasi-judi-
cial adjudicatory functions that are largely indistinguishable from
the activities of the courts. Agencies make decisions based on the
record of adversary hearings, and they interpret statutes and de-
cide questions of historical fact in the process.9 5 Administrative
agency decisions can affect litigants in much the same manner as
judicial decisions.96 Agency decisions are subject to judicial review
just as trial court decisions are subject to appellate review.97
By focusing on the quasi-judicial functions of agencies, a func-
tional analysis seems to dictate treating the agency like a court.
Agencies, however, generally perform a variety of other functions
often characterized as legislative or executive in nature.98 The
package of functions in its entirety arguably results in an entity
that is sufficiently different from courts so as to make application
of the controlling case doctrine either completely inappropriate or
applicable only to the agency's quasi-judicial activities.9
94. To say that a doctrine applies a priori to a given situation suggests that the doc-
trine can be treated as a text with a fixed meaning. In recent years, commentators from
various disciplines have noted the theoretical difficulties underlying the concept of looking
at the "plain meaning" of a text. Texts are, after all, composed of words that have meanings
and implications that change according to the reader's beginning assumptions. Those mean-
ings also change over time. See Levinson, Law and Literature, 60 Tax. L. REv. 373 (1982).
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1982) (governing proceedings in on-the-record hearings con-
ducted by federal agencies subject to the Administrative Procedure Act).
96. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMiNISTRATIVE LAW 62-90 (2d ed. 1984)
97. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
98. See B. SCHwARTZ, supra note 96, at 1-14.
99. Agency activity such as initial claims processing and approval of grant moneys
takes place in contexts that appear far different from the traditional judicial proceeding. To
the extent that such activities are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
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The controlling case doctrine itself, therefore, does not provide
a clear solution to the question whether administrative agencies
should be treated like courts in applying the doctrine. Unfortu-
nately, the policy justifications for the doctrine do not supply a
clear answer either.
Adherents of stare decisis justify the doctrine by reference to
several policy arguments. First, stare decisis furthers certainty and
predictability in the law. Those characteristics are necessary both
to protect individual reliance interests and to conserve litigant and
judicial resources by minimizing the incentive or need to forum
shop or relitigate questions of law. Second, stare decisis promotes
uniformity in the law, which helps ensure equality among litigants.
Third, the Constitution delegates lawmaking functions to the legis-
lature. Stare decisis preserves constitutionally mandated separa-
tion of powers by avoiding judicial usurpation of the legislature's
lawmaking functions. In making policy choices, the legislature can
decide not to act and thus implicitly approve judicially created le-
gal doctrines without fear that the courts will overturn this legisla-
tive policy choice.100
The justifications for the controlling case doctrine generally
are the same as those supporting stare decisis. The controlling case
doctrine furthers the institutional considerations of conserving liti-
gant and judicial resources by encouraging certainty and predict-
ability. Without the controlling case doctrine, some judges might
refuse to follow appellate decisions even when the appellate court
unquestionably would apply its earlier decision. Litigants and the
judiciary would be forced to expend resources on unnecessary ap-
peals. Some litigants might forego a successful appeal because they
could not afford the cost of litigation. Uniformity would be under-
mined as litigation burdens are distributed unevenly, based on who
is initially assigned as a trial judge.
§§ 551-706 (1982), they are classified as "informal" adjudicatory proceedings and are not
required to be handled by means of on-the-record proceedings under §§ 554-556. Cf. Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In most agencies, the bulk
of "adjudicative" activity is comprised of informal proceedings. Agencies also perform a va-
riety of actions that resemble prosecutorial or legislative functions more than traditional
adjudicative functions. Many commentators have suggested that such functions can be per-
formed more effectively by means of decisionmaking models that differ substantially from
the judicial model associated with the controlling case doctrine. See, e.g. J. MASHAW. Bu-
REAUCRATIC JUSTICM MANAGING SocIL SECURITY DIsABi.rry CLAIMS (1983). Cf. Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353 (1978).
100. For a discussion of the policies underlying stare decisis, see MuRPHY & RUaTR,
supra note 93, at 93-102.
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In important respects the policy justifications underlying the
controlling case doctrine apply to agencies as well as courts.
Agency actions affect litigants who may need to rely on decisions
of the agency.10 1 Fairness concerns arise when agencies treat simi-
larly situated litigants differently. 102 The need to relitigate an issue
on appeal burdens litigants before an agency as much as litigants
before a court.103 The burden on the courts from relitigation also
could be substantial, because judicial review of agency decisions
already accounts for a high percentage of the judicial caseload. 0 4
Compelling policy arguments against stare decisis and the con-
trolling case doctrine also are available, however, both generally
and as the doctrine would apply to administrative agencies. Flexi-
bility and responsiveness to changed circumstances are important
values in American culture. Those concerns often will counsel
against strict adherence to precedent. At times, reaching a correct
decision may seem more important than avoiding relitigation or a
temporary inequality of result among individuals. In cases of ad-
ministrative agency nonacquiescence, however, the agency ordina-
rily will be unable to justify its refusal to follow judicial precedent
as a need for responsiveness to change. After all, the agency ordi-
narily seeks to adhere to a consistent position, notwithstanding
101. American businesses make investment choices in a heavily regulated environ-
ment. Therefore, they must rely on court interpretation of applicable statutes in making
their choices.
102. A recent comment on the SSA expressed concern that decisionmaking on social
security and SSI disability claims is so unpredictable as to create fairness concerns. See
Stewart, The Limits of Administrative Law, in THE COURTS: SEPARATION OF POWERS (B.
Goulet ed. 1983).
103. In some cases, in fact, the burden may be greater for the litigant dealing with an
agency. For instance, a high percentage of individuals claiming social security or SSI bene-
fits are unrepresented and have limited knowledge and financial resources. Few claimants
request an ALJ hearing to challenge an unfavorable decision. Even fewer seek judicial re-
view of an adverse AUJ decision. See HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 12, at 126-30. Yet
the decision to appeal does not seem to correlate with the strength of a claimant's case. See
J. MASHAW, supra note 63, at 134-39. Thus, failure to require agency adherence to judicial
precedent may have the effect of denying benefits to many claimants who would win if they
obtained judicial review.
104. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 104-111, 132
(1984) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT]. The report notes that in 1984, 9.7% of cases
filed in the courts of appeals involved direct review of administrative agency cases. Id. at
109. Additionally, appeals from district court decisions in social security matters constituted
more than 4% of total filings, with appeals in tax and environmental cases adding another
2%. Id. at 111. Thus, challenges to agency action accounted for more than 15% of the total
caseload of the courts of appeals. At the district court level, social security cases now consti-
tute 11.4% of filings because of a tripling in the number of appeals since 1980. Id. at 110-11.
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contrary judicial precedent. Depending on the issue, however, the
agency may be able to make a compelling argument that correct
resolution of the issue (that is, resolution along the lines proposed
by the agency) is sufficiently important that the agency should not
be treated as a court and should be allowed to disregard judicial
precedent.
The agency also can counter the argument that the controlling
case doctrine is necessary to avoid judicial usurpation of legislative
powers. American legal theory currently recognizes that lawmaking
is not limited to the legislature. In a common-law system, the
courts necessarily make law. Thus, an agency performing quasi-ju-
dicial functions may intrude on the judicial prerogative by failing
to follow the controlling case doctrine, but the agency does not
necessarily interfere with legislative functions. In addition, the
agency reasonably can argue that because the legislature delegated
decisionmaking power to the agency, treating the agency as a court
that must follow precedent is inconsistent with democratic deci-
sionmaking and constitutes a breach of the separation of powers.10 5
In sum, stare decisis and controlling case doctrine are not clearly
applicable to administrative agencies, and the policies justifying
those doctrines do not necessarily support their extension to
agencies.
2. Which Courts' Decisions Are Controlling Cases?
In a judicial system with only one appellate court, application
of the controlling case doctrine is straightforward. A trial court in
the State of Rhode Island, for instance, must follow decisions by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
Application of the doctrine becomes more difficult in judicial
systems that contain multiple appellate courts. Two questions
arise: first, which appellate court decisions should a trial court fol-
low? and second, must one appellate court follow the precedents
handed down earlier by another appellate court at the same level?
In the federal court system, those qlestions have been answered
largely by the development of the doctrine known as the "law of
the circuit." Under that approach, precedents issued by the court
of appeals for a particular circuit constitute controlling cases for
the district courts within the circuit. District courts may, but need
not, follow the law of other circuits. Similarly, the courts of appeals




do not necessarily follow decisions issued in other circuits.'
In a court system with multiple appellate courts, the law of
the circuit concept is not the only possible approach to deciding
which cases are controlling. An alternative approach to the ques-
tion of which appellate court decisions a trial court should follow
would require lower courts to follow decisions by all courts at
higher levels within the judicial system. Thus, the District Court
for Hawaii would be required to follow First Circuit precedents as
well as Ninth Circuit precedents. Similarly, the question of
whether an appellate court must follow precedents from other ap-
pellate courts could be answered by requiring courts at one level of
the hierarchy to follow decisions of other courts at the same level.
The first case to decide a particular question would bind all courts
at the same level of the judicial hierarchy. Thus, a decision by the
First Circuit would be binding in a later case decided by the Tenth
Circuit. At least one commentator has suggested that this "first-in-
time" approach to the controlling case doctrine characterized
American judicial practices during the nineteenth century and
should be followed now.'07
Under the version of controlling case doctrine implicit in the
law of the circuit approach to stare decisis, agency intercircuit non-
acquiescence would be proper if the doctrine treated agencies like
courts. Agencies could not engage in intracircuit nonacquiescence,
however. If a first-in-time approach to the controlling case doctrine
were adopted, even intercircuit nonacquiescence would be
forbidden.
The federal courts effectively have chosen to adopt a law of
the circuit approach to controlling case doctrine, rather than a
first-in-time approach.'0 8 This choice presumably reflects a value
judgment favoring flexibility and thorough development of statu-
tory interpretation over uniform treatment of litigants. Sound pol-
icy arguments can support either of these conflicting values in the
case of administrative agencies. On the one hand, members of Con-
gress and the public who favor creating a particular administrative
agency often have argued that an agency can provide desirable
flexibility and an opportunity for creative, experimental develop-
106. Vestal, supra note 10, contains a lengthy historical discussion of court of appeals
practices regarding the precedential value of decisions from other circuits. See also Friendly,
The "Law of the Circuit" And All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 413 (1972); Generali v.
D'Amico, 766 F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir. 1985).
107. See Vestal, supra note 10, at 130-35.
108. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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ment of regulation.109 A law of the circuit approach arguably
should govern agencies because the agency should retain the flexi-
bility to disregard judicial precedent after due consideration. This
approach would permit intercircuit nonacquiescence. On the other
hand, many agencies are established in part to administer national
regulatory or benefit programs, which replace a patchwork of vary-
ing state programs.1 0 Thus, uniform treatment of litigants argua-
bly should be a primary value, and a first-in-time approach should
govern, which would prohibit even intercircuit nonacquiescence.
3. The Position of the Agency/Court Within the Judicial
Hierarchy
The controlling case doctrine is premised on a hierarchical ar-
rangement of courts in which higher courts are by definition those
that review decisions of lower courts, and the decisions of higher
courts bind lower courts. In applying that scheme to the agency/
court relationship, administrative agencies whose decisions are
subject to review by district courts should be treated as courts oc-
cupying a level in the hierarchy below that of the district courts.
Thus, district court decisions should be controlling cases for the
SSA, for instance.
Binding an agency to the decisions of all ninety-six' district
court judges potentially creates serious practical problems. If the
agency followed a first-in-time rule, the agency would have to track
all litigation carefully enough to create a satisfactory record for ap-
peal and would have to litigate each case fully to avoid "freezing"
the development of the law without full consideration of the is-
sues.1 12 Alternatively, if the agency followed only district court de-
cisions from its own district (that is, if the agency engaged in in-
terdistrict nonacquiescence), the agency would face the logistical
109. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 782 (1948).
110. See, e.g., Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383 (1982)
(establishing the federally funded and administered SSI program to replace state adminis-
tered programs funded in part); Title XIV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-
1355 (1982) (establishing grants to states for aid to disabled) repealed by Act of Oct. 30,
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 303(a), (b), 86 Stat. 1484, except as to Puerto Rico, Guam and
the Virgin Islands.
111. 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-132 (1982). The figure includes Puerto Rico.
112. Proponents of current government nonacquiescence practices cite the need for
thorough development of important issues as a justification for the practice. See, e.g., Bator,
supra note 8, at 80. See also Levin & Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United States
Government, 70 IowA L. REv. 113, 125 n.91 (1984) (discussing arguments by the United
States that collateral estoppel should not apply against the government).
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problems of distributing multiple sets of instructions to different
offices.113
Those problems could be alleviated by treating these agencies
like courts, but not courts located at the bottom of the pyramid.
The SSA, for example, could be bound only to follow decisions of
the courts of appeals. The agency thus would have to contend with
fewer binding precedents.114
Such an approach has considerable practical appeal and has
been adopted implicitly by many litigants challenging SSA nonac-
quiescence. It does not, however, seem justifiable under the con-
trolling case doctrine, either conceptually or structurally. In effect,
this approach would treat the agency like a court occupying the
same level as the district courts for the purpose of applying prece-
dent under the controlling case doctrine, even though the district
courts have judicial review authority over individual decisions by
the SSA.
4. Identifying the "Judge" Who Is "Controlled"
Stare decisis and the controlling case doctrine developed in
the American judicial system as a method of channeling judicial
discretion. Traditionally, lawyers and scholars have viewed judges
as the key decisionmakers of legal issues arising in the system.115
Perhaps as a result, the courts make no direct attempt to use the
doctrine to limit the discretion of other participants in the system.
Prosecutors, for example, may exercise their discretion to charge
defendants with crimes or to seek penalties in situations in which a
controlling case would not justify such a charge.1 6 More com-
monly, prosecutors may choose to drop charges against potential
defendants despite controlling case law that unquestionably
criminalizes the behavior at issue.117
Administrative agencies operate somewhat like a mini-judicial
113. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
114. Note, however, that the agency still would face the need to monitor district court
litigation to make an adequate record for decisions by the court of appeals.
115. Robert L. Rabin discusses the deficiencies of this traditional bias in R. RABIN,
PERSPECTI ES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 7-8 (1979).
116. In theory, at least, the Code of Professional Responsibility limits the discretion of
prosecutors in making charging decisions. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
7-103 (1979).
117. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 3.1-.92 (relating to the
prosecution function) and §§ 4.1-.117 (relating to the defense function) (Supp. 1986). See




system. ALJs or agency members act as judges. Other agency per-
sonnel perform different tasks. In the case of a regulatory agency,
such as the NLRB, agency staff must prosecute suspected violators
of the law.118 The personnel of a benefits-awarding agency, such as
the SSA, make initial determinations to grant or deny claims. Un-
less controlling case doctrine were applied to the prosecutorial or
claim-deciding staff, the doctrine would require adherence to con-
trolling decisions in only a fraction of the cases coming before the
agency. After all, only a small portion of most agency business
reaches the formal adjudicatory hearing stage.119 Yet the Supreme
Court recently held that the enforcement decisions of administra-
tive agencies are presumptively immune from judicial review. 2 '
Requiring all agency personnel to follow controlling cases
would expand the doctrine well beyond its traditional confines.
The doctrine developed in the context of controlling the behavior
of judges, and not in the context of regulating the behavior of par-
ties or other participants in the system.'2 ' Thus, controlling case
doctrine has an important limit as applied to administrative agen-
cies. The doctrine plausibly can be used only to analyze nonacqui-
escence by agency "judicial" personnel, such as ALJs.
118. See supra note 18. The problem of the duty of agency prosecutorial staff to fol-
low controlling case law arose in Teamsters Local 515, 248 N.L.R.B. 83 (1980), rev'd sub
nom. Helton v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Charles Helton, a union member, filed
unfair labor practice charges against his union for removing dissident literature from a
union bulletin board. The regional director dismissed the charges (letter dated Oct. 11, 1983
on file with the author) and the general counsel refused to overrule the regional director's
refusal to issue a complaint (letter dated Jan. 4, 1984 on file with the author). The union
member previously had prevailed on a similar complaint in the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals after proceedings in which the regional director did file charges, the ALJ found an
unfair labor practice, and the Board reversed the AIU, dismissing the complaint. Teamsters
Local 515, 248 N.L.R.B. 83 (1980), rev'd sub nom. Helton v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir.
1981). The charging party argued that the court of appeals precedent constituted the law of
the case and not merely controlling case precedent. Neither the regional director nor the
General Counsel referred to the court of appeals decision, which apparently was the only
judicial decision on point. See, Mattson, supra note 89.
119. See HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 12, at 127. Presumably, informal agency
decisions would be handled with a view toward the expected results on appeal. In an agency
with low appeal rates or high incentives to ignore judicial precedent, this deterrent effect
might be limited.
120. Heckler v. Chaney, 104 S. Ct. 3532 (1985).
121. Judges are trained in professional norms and have access to law books, unlike
some administrative agency personnel. Lack of legal training or access to law books does not
create an insuperable obstacle to compliance with judicial precedent by prosecutorial or
claims processing staff, however. Claims processing staff members in particular are accus-
tomed to receiving detailed instructions for their work. Someone within the agency would




Current versions of stare decisis, in its manifestations as con-
trolling case doctrine and the law of the circuit, provide limited
assistance in analyzing administrative agency nonacquiescence.
The doctrine plausibly could be used to require some agency deci-
sionmakers, such as ALJs, to follow judicial decisions in cases aris-
ing within the jurisdiction of the court rendering the decision. In
conceptual terms, however, stare decisis simply does not seem rele-
vant to the full range of agency nonacquiescence activity. In addi-
tion, one can raise strong practical objections to applying stare de-
cisis concepts to forbid nonacquiescence even in this limited
fashion.
B. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel)
A few litigants and courts have alluded to doctrines governing
preclusion 122 in their analyses of administrative agency nonacqui-
escence. For reasons that will be elaborated below, preclusion doc-
trines do not fit the nonacquiescence problem well. The doctrine of
issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, prevents one
party to a lawsuit from relitigating an issue that was actually and
necessarily decided against it in an earlier lawsuit.123 Administra-
tive agencies function as parties to litigation in addition to acting
as decisionmakers. Consequently, issue preclusion, a doctrine fo-
cused on parties, provides a slightly different approach to adminis-
trative agency nonacquiescence than the controlling case doctrine,
which focuses on the behavior of courts as decisionmakers. Courts
and litigants could use issue preclusion to affect agency nonacqui-
escence in two ways. An agency as a party could be precluded from
relitigating before the agency as decisionmaker an issue that a
court previously decided against the agency. Alternatively, the
agency as a party could be precluded from relitigating in court an
issue on which the agency earlier lost in court.
122. See Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985, 988 (D.N.C. 1984) (Finding of Fact No. 7)
vacated and remanded, 757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1985). The application of preclusion doc-
trines to nonacquiescence is addressed in Note, Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence:
Precluding Government Relitigation in the Pursuit of Litigant Equality, 99 HARv. L. Rzv.
847 (1986).
123. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982).
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1. Doctrinal Obstacles to Using Preclusion to Control Agency
Nonacquiescence
The basic elements of issue preclusion ordinarily are present
in a case of agency nonacquiescence: the question of statutory in-
terpretation on which issue preclusion is sought was by definition
actually litigated and determined by a valid final judgment in the
earlier action. Two important exceptions to the application of issue
preclusion potentially limit the usefulness of the doctrine in ana-
lyzing administrative agency nonacquiescence. First, the doctrine
currently is applied against the government only in limited circum-
stances.124 Second, preclusion on issues of law is disfavored.12 5
a. Precluding the Government
Forty-five years ago American courts almost uniformly applied
mutuality requirements to collateral estoppel. A court would pre-
vent a party from relitigating issues finally determined in a prior
proceeding only if both the party seeking to preclude relitigation
and the party seeking to relitigate the issue were parties to the
prior litigation.126 The mutuality requirement lives on in current
limitations on precluding relitigation by the government. Two re-
cent Supreme Court decisions define these limits. 1 7
In United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co.,128 the Supreme
Court applied mutual defensive preclusion against the government.
The Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency could
not relitigate the issue of the permissibility of certain inspections
of private contractor premises under the Clean Air Act when the
government previously had litigated the same issue against the
same party in a case involving essentially identical facts. The
Court determined that no special circumstances were present that
warranted an exception to normal rules of preclusion. In the com-
panion case of United States v. Mendoza,'29 however, the Court
held that the doctrine of nonmutual offensive preclusion may not
be applied against the government in cases involving different
plaintiffs. In reaching its decision in Mendoza, the Court relied
124. See id. at § 27.
125. See id. at §§ 28(2), 29(7).
126. E.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912). See also RE-
STATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 43(b) (1942).
127. For an analysis of the problem of applying preclusion concepts against the gov-
ernment in light of these cases, see Levin & Leeson, supra note 112.
128. 465 U.S. 165 (1984).
129. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
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primarily on the value of "permitting several courts of appeals to
explore a difficult question"'130 before Supreme Court review. The
Court also emphasized the prudential considerations that influence
the Solicitor General in his decision whether to request certiorari
and the effect of a change in executive administration on govern-
ment litigation policy. 1'3
Absent a change in the law, Stauffer and Mendoza severely
limit the usefulness of issue preclusion as a device for controlling
administrative agency nonacquiescence. In light of the mutuality
requirement for the application of issue preclusion against an
agency, only parties engaged in repeat litigation of the same issues
(presumably with the same agency) can rely on the doctrine. 13 2
b. Preclusion on Issues of Law
A second exception to issue preclusion governs preclusion on
issues of law. Earlier in this century, courts held categorically that
claim preclusion and issue preclusion doctrines applied only to
questions of fact.' 33 To the extent that courts applied a rigid ver-
sion of stare decisis, application of preclusion concepts to issues of
law was redundant." More recently, courts and commentators
have suggested that preclusion on issues of law is permitted in
some circumstances.' 35
The use of defensive mutual issue preclusion that was ap-
proved in United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co.136 involved an
issue of law.' 37 The Supreme Court acknowledged in Stauffer that
130. Id. at 160.
131. Id. at 161.
132. Thus, after Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982), Juanita Patti could
challenge a third effort by the SSA to terminate her benefits by forcing the SSA to show her
condition had improved. Other social security claimants could not use issue preclusion to
prevent the agency from relitigating the question whether the SSA may terminate a recipi-
ent's benefits without showing an improvement in the recipient's medical condition. Those
recipients would be forced to litigate the question of disability on the merits to retain bene-
fits. Note that the class action device provides a method of binding the agency in circum-
stances in which mutuality is lacking. A few courts have certified "nationwide" class actions
to bind the agency and possible litigants in one proceeding. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442
U.S. 682 (1979). Note also that in a class action on a nonacquiescence issue the court and
litigants would face the question whether earlier judicial precedents should be considered
controlling cases.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924).
134. See Hazard, Preclusion as to Issues of Law: The Legal System's Interest, 70
IOWA L. REv. 81, 89-90 (1984), for an historical perspective on preclusion on issues of law.
135. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2) (1980).
136. 464 U.S. 165 (1984).
137. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984), also involved an issue of law.
1986]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
an exception to preclusion exists for issues of law. The Court ex-
pressed uncertainty about the scope and purposes of the exception
but held that the exception did not prevent the application of issue
preclusion in a case that involved the same parties and "an issue
arising in both cases from virtually identical facts."'138
Requiring mutuality to preclude the government from reliti-
gating an issue renders preclusion concepts inapplicable to most
instances of agency nonacquiescence. The legal issues exception to
preclusion potentially limits the remaining usefulness that preclu-
sion doctrines might have in later actions between the same par-
ties. Administrative agency nonacquiescence by definition involves
an issue of law. A subsequent lawsuit involving the same litigant
against the same agency does not necessarily involve substantially
similar facts. These cases involve claims falling at all points along
the continuum of "relatedness."
As an example, two social security disability cases involving
the same claimant might arise in any of the following contexts. Ms.
Jones receives disability benefits for a heart condition. In 1982 the
SSA terminates Ms. Jones' benefits. A reviewing court interprets
the Social Security Act as requiring the SSA to show that Ms.
Jones' medical condition has improved, which the SSA has not
done. Therefore, the termination is reversed. The most closely re-
lated subsequent claim would be an immediate attempt by the
SSA to terminate Ms. Jones' benefits based on an evaluation of her
medical condition identical to that in the first claim. The relation-
ship between the two cases would appear less closely related as
time passed or as the medical basis for termination altered. For
instance, suppose Ms. Jones' heart condition did improve and she
stopped receiving disability benefits. If she later received benefits
Petitioner asserted that "the [g]overnment's administration of the Nationality Act denied
him due process of law." Id. at 155. The court resolved Mendoza on the broad ground that
mutuality is required for application of issue preclusion against the government.
138. Stauffer, 464 U.S. at 172. In Stauffer the government argued that parties are not
precluded from relitigating a legal issue in a "subsequent action upon a different demand."
Id. at 172 n.5 (quoting United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. at 242). The government inter-
preted the "same demand" requirement as requiring that "two cases presenting the same
legal issue ... arise from the very same facts or transactions." 464 U.S. at 172 n.5. The
court rejected the "general applicability" of that requirement outside the tax context. The
court approved the language of comment b to § 28 of the Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments that would allow preclusion when claims are "closely related," regardless of the char-
acterization of the issue as one of law or fact. Id. at 171. The court did not address the
Restatements phrasing of the issues of law exception to preclusion, which would require
that "the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated." RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2)(a) (1980).
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for a psychiatric disability and the SSA again attempted to termi-
nate her benefits, an appeal of the new termination would appear
substantially unrelated to the original case. Under Stauffer the
agency would be precluded from relitigating the question of
whether it must show medical improvement under some variations
of the first example, but probably would not be precluded in the
second example.
2. Policy Justifications for Issue Preclusion As Applied to
Agency Nonacquiescence
Current approaches to the preclusion doctrine would not limit
agency nonacquiescence materially. The doctrine could be ex-
panded to prohibit nonacquiescence if the courts deemed such an
expansion desirable. The question thus arises: Should preclusion
concepts be applied to prevent nonacquiescence?
Three policy considerations usually are advanced to justify
preclusion doctrines. Preclusion protects litigants against the costs
and harassment associated with relitigation of claims. Preclusion
similarly protects the judicial system by conserving resources. Fi-
nally, the doctrine prevents inconsistency in the law and thereby
encourages reliance on judicial decisions. 39 The overriding concern
of the doctrine is the desire to encourage repose. Countervailing
concerns, however, must be accommodated. The court's decision in
the previous case may be "wrong." If that is true, then the empha-
sis on repose causes both the individual and society to suffer. The
''error" may result from an inadequate presentation in the original
case, perhaps because the parties lacked sufficient incentive to liti-
gate. Alternatively, the "error" may reflect changes in the law and
differing perceptions about what the law ought to be. Finally, the
decision simply may be "wrong" in the sense that a later court
would decide the issue differently. These concerns operate differ-
ently at the agency level and at the judicial level.
a. Precluding the Agency from Relitigating Issues in the
Courts
Agency relitigation practices raise the same policy concerns as
agency nonacquiescence, but the two are not identical. The courts
could rebuff an agency's attempts to relitigate issues on judicial
139. See Mogel, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Administrative Proceedings,
30 BAYLOR L. REV. 463 (1978). Note the similarity of the policy justifications for preclusion
and for stare decisis.
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review. That judicial action would not necessarily force the agency
either as party or as decisionmaker at the agency level to follow
the position of the first reviewing court. As with the controlling
case doctrine, applying issue preclusion to agency relitigation prac-
tices would affect agency nonacquiescence only to the extent that
the agency experiences a high appeal rate and has limited incen-
tive to delay the effective date of the court's interpretation on an
issue. Thus, in practical terms, applying issue preclusion to govern-
ment relitigation practices would not necessarily resolve the ques-
tion of nonacquiescence.
Courts and commentators who have addressed the applicabil-
ity of preclusion concepts to administrative agencies have focused
primarily on agency relitigation practices in the courts. 140 Identify-
ing the problem as agency relitigation results in an emphasis on
the agency's behavior in its role as a party before the courts.
Traditional preclusion concerns thus seem directly implicated in
the following issue: Should the courts apply nonmutual preclusion,
either offensive or defensive, to prevent the government from relit-
igating a question if a court previously has rejected the agency's
position on that issue?
The policy concerns that support and oppose preclusion do
not lead to an easy assessment of the desirability of administrative
agency relitigation. In the case of nonmutual preclusion against the
government, the party seeking to preclude relitigation by definition
has not litigated the issue previously. Therefore, concerns about
protecting the individual litigant from the cost and annoyance of
repetitive litigation are inapplicable.
Precluding government relitigation, however, could conserve
judicial resources because the government could not raise the same
issue repeatedly in successive lawsuits. The extent of these savings
would depend on several factors. First, for savings to occur, a court
must expend fewer resources in applying preclusion concepts than
a court that decides the merits of both the relitigated lawsuit and
any additional lawsuits that would be brought only if the preclu-
sion concepts were not applied. 41 Second, any conservation of ju-
dicial resources would depend on how broadly a court interpreted
140. See, e.g., United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984); United States
v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984); Vestal, supra note 10; Levin & Leeson, supra note 112, at
127-29.
141. We must necessarily rely on a rough prediction to determine how much addi-
tional litigation would be generated by failure to apply preclusion concepts. Empirical data
would be difficult to obtain.
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preclusion concepts. For instance, preclusion might apply only to
issues litigated at the court of appeals level, on the ground that the
government has insufficient incentive (or insufficient logistical ca-
pabilities) to litigate each issue fully in the district courts. This
approach still might allow some relitigation and consequent drain
of judicial resources at the district court level. Third, savings
would depend on whether preclusion concepts were applied across
circuit boundaries. Professor Vestal argued strenuously in favor of
preclusion across circuit boundaries, relying on the unitary nature
of the federal court system.'4 2 Justice White, on the other hand,
suggested in Stauffer that preclusion applied only to "conclusive
resolution of disputes within their [courts'] jurisdictions," and de-
fined the courts of different circuits as having separate jurisdic-
tions.143 Fourth, conservation of judicial resources would depend
on the ease with which agencies could argue successfully that cir-
cumstances had changed enough that preclusion should not apply.
Potential cost savings to the judicial system from applying issue
preclusion to government agencies thus are extremely dependent
on circumstances.
Precluding relitigation would promote consistency and reli-
ance if it discouraged government relitigation and eliminated non-
acquiescence. If agencies continued to engage in nonacquiescence,
however, the results in decisions at the agency level would be in-
consistent with the results of cases in which the litigants sought
judicial review. Once again one cannot predict any clear-cut results
from applying preclusion concepts.
Arguments against applying preclusion concepts to govern-
ment agencies are also fact dependent. Courts would be more con-
cerned that erroneous legal interpretations might bind agency liti-
gants unfairly when the agency operated in circumstances that
predictably might result in such unfairness. The agency often may
have insufficient incentive, opportunity, or ability to litigate an is-
sue fully if the agency handles a high volume of cases or has insuf-
ficient legal staff to manage the workload. The urgency of each fac-
tor will vary among agencies and will vary over time with each
agency. The SSA, for instance, may face more serious problems
than the NLRB in these areas.' 44
142. Vestal, supra note 10, at 170-74.
143. 464 U.S. at 176 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 153 (1979)) (emphasis added by Justice White).
144. Of the regulatory agencies, the NLRB last year handled the highest number of
new judicial appeals-557 case filings. The SSA had 29,985 new filings in the district courts
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Likewise, courts would vary in their concern over "errors" that
resulted from changes in the law or from differing perceptions of
what the law ought to be, according to the importance they place
on the underlying issues. Courts might be more willing to preclude
agency relitigation if they believed that a settled answer was more
important than a "right" answer. Thus, preclusion concepts pro-
vide limited assistance in understanding agency nonacquiescence,
even when the focus is strictly on the agency's role as a party in
relitigation before the courts.
b. Precluding the Agency-Party From Relitigating Issues
Before the Agency-Decisionmaker
The courts could discourage nonacquiescence indirectly by
precluding agency relitigation before the courts, or they could at-
tempt to apply issue preclusion concepts directly to activity at the
agency level. Two doctrinal steps are necessary before issue preclu-
sion can be used as a method to prevent the agency from disre-
garding prior judicial decisions when the agency acts on later cases
arising in the administrative process. First, the agency must be
treated as a party to its own administrative proceedings. Second, a
court must find that the agency is engaging in "relitigation."
The term "party" most commonly applies to those persons
who sue and are sued in adversary proceedings and who therefore
are entitled to appear and present evidence and arguments in sup-
port of a position. 145 Procedural rules that govern necessary parties
in civil actions and the right to intervene in civil or administrative
proceedings suggest that a person whose rights may be affected by
a proceeding may become a party.146
In the traditional sense, an administrative agency has no
"rights" that will be affected by an agency adjudicative hearing.
Practically speaking, however, the decision resulting from an ad-
ministrative hearing may affect substantially the parameters
within which the agency must operate. In that sense, administra-
tive proceedings may affect the agency's right to take certain ac-
tions. Furthermore, many agencies function as "parties" in their
and 992 in the courts of appeals. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 104, at 109, 112, 133. See
also 46 NLRB ANN. REP. 23-24 (1981). The number of cases seeking judicial review of SSA
decisions has risen dramatically in recent years. As of December 1985 there were 52,795 such
cases pending in the district courts. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
145. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1010 (5th ed. 1979).
146. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 24; Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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own administrative hearings in that agency personnel appear at
the proceedings to present evidence and arguments. 14 7 Other ad-
ministrative hearings, such as the SSA's, are considered nonadver-
sarial because the agency is not separately represented. 148 One no
doubt would still consider a person claiming benefits in such a
hearing to be a "party." The agency's position, however, is less
clear. In adversarial adjudications, treating the agency as a party
to its own proceedings seems plausible. Such treatment seems less
plausible in nonadversarial hearings.
Similarly, applying the term "relitigation" to agency efforts to
present arguments in adversarial administrative hearings does no
violence to our current understanding of the term. The agency as
party seems to engage in relitigation when it pursues arguments
before the agency as decisionmaker that a court previously
rejected.
By contrast, applying issue preclusion concepts to informal
agency actions preceding a formal adjudicatory hearing would re-
quire transforming our understanding of both the term "party"
and the term "relitigation." In these informal proceedings 19 one
ordinarily views the agency as a regulator, licenser, or dispenser of
benefits-but not as a party. Nor can the grant or denial of a li-
cense or disability benefits readily be defined as an act of litiga-
tion, even though in acting the agency may interpret a statute pre-
viously considered by a court. Exempting informal action from the
reach of issue preclusion might limit substantially the doctrine's
practical usefulness in establishing parameters for
nonacquiescence.
The courts, nonetheless, plausibly could decide to apply issue
preclusion in adversary hearings. Should they do so? The effect of
applying issue preclusion to prevent nonacquiescence in adminis-
trative hearings would be similar to the effect of adopting a first-
in-time version of the controlling case doctrine. Once again, the
agency would find itself at the bottom of the pyramid. The agency
potentially would be bound to follow the first judicial decision on a
147. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 96, at 13-14.
148. See HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 12, at 64-74, 97-98.
149. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, "informal" adjudication is a residual
category, covering proceedings that (1) are not defined as rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. §
551(4) and (5); and (2) do not involve adjudication "on the record after opportunity for
agency hearing." 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982). I use the term "informal" to refer to such actions
taken outside the context of on the record hearings.
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given issue, a result that gives rise to problems discussed above.15
C. Due Process
The due process clause of the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution limits the power of the federal government by
providing: "nor shall any person. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."' 151 Due process analysis pro-
vides a third method for analyzing administrative agency nonac-
quiescence when agency nonacquiescence would deprive the liti-
gant of life, liberty, or property. 152 At least one court has given
preliminary approval to this approach. 53
The controlling case doctrine focuses on the agency as court
and preclusion analysis deals with the agency as party. The due
process argument builds on the agency's role as government deci-
sionmaker-that is, as the state. The due process analysis thus ap-
plies to decisionmaking within the agency, rather than the agency's
relitigation policy before the courts. Because agency decisionmak-
ing takes place in different contexts, one can identify at least two
versions of the analysis.
The first argument applies to agency decisionmaking in consti-
tutionally required administrative hearings. That argument is as
follows: A key element of due process is the right to be heard. 154
Although due process is flexible, the right to be heard must occur
in a meaningful time and manner. 55 Courts currently determine
whether a decisionmaking process comports with due process re-
quirements by balancing the accuracy of decisionmaking under a
given procedure, the incremental increase in accuracy that results
from a different procedure, and the costs of imposing the new pro-
cedure. 56 A decision is accurate only if it applies controlling law.
When an agency decision is based on interpretation of a statute, a
150. See supra text accompanying note 36.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
152. Most nonacquiescence situations would fall into one of these categories. The due
process clause certainly applies to much of the work of agencies that dispense benefits. See,
e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (termination of Social Security benefits). The
business of regulatory agencies is similarly affected by due process requirements. The
NLRB operates under statutorily required hearing procedures, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982),
which presumably are required under the due process clause in order to avoid impermissible
deprivations of liberty or property.
153. Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983), affd in part, 725 F.2d 1489
(9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 583 (mem. 1984).
154. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
155. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
156. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
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prior judicial interpretation of the statute qualifies as controlling
law. Therefore, due process prohibits an agency from engaging in
nonacquiescence by ignoring prior judicial precedent.
The second due process argument applies to agency decision-
making leading up to a due process hearing in which the claimant
posits a due process right to reasonably fair and accurate agency
determinations before the hearing stage. Again, the due process ar-
gument would contend that reasonably fair and accurate decisions
mean decisions that follow controlling law, and judicial precedent
is controlling law. A preliminary problem arises when a claimant
attempts a due process analysis at the prehearing stage. Due pro-
cess applies at the prehearing stage only to the extent that the ef-
fect of an agency action can be characterized as a deprivation of an
interest protected by due process.157 In one sense, the agency deci-
sion that triggers a request for a due process hearing does not work
a deprivation of "life, liberty, or property" because the decision
becomes final only after the hearing. 58 On the other hand, such a
decision ordinarily acts as a final determination of a person's
rights, absent a request for a hearing. Even if he or she does re-
quest a hearing, the person dealing with the agency suffers a tem-
porary deprivation unless the hearing takes place before the
agency has effectuated its action.
Unlike the analyses considered previously, this second due
process argument would affect all cases handled by an agency, and
not merely those cases reaching the administrative hearing or judi-
cial review stages. The argument thus has considerable appeal to
an opponent of nonacquiescence, particularly as applied to an
agency like the SSA. The argument is appealing because the bulk
of final agency action in determining SSA claims takes place before
the formal adjudicatory hearing stage. 59 Prohibiting nonacquies-
cence at the hearing and judicial review stages would affect rela-
tively few claimants and a small percentage of the agency's work.
Yet most of the individuals affected by the SSA are unrepresented
and suffer from serious limitations in their legal sophistication and
their physical and mental abilities to pursue their claims. Conse-
quently, those who appeal are not necessarily the ones whose
claims are the strongest. 60 Accurate agency decisionmaking at the
initial stage of processing claims, therefore, is much more signifi-
157. Cf. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
158. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232 (1980).
159. See HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 12, at 49.
160. See J. MASHAW, supra note 63, at 134-39.
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cant in the overall system than accurate decisionmaking at adjudi-
catory hearings.
Strong arguments also can be marshalled in opposition to ap-
plying due process analysis to initial agency decisionmaking that
precedes formal adjudicatory hearings. Requiring accurate agency
decisionmaking as a matter of due process potentially has the ef-
fect of "constitutionalizing" lower level agency procedures. Each
time a party claims that an agency's procedures did not lead to
reasonably accurate decisionmaking, the party could contend that
the agency violated due process requirements. This prospect raises
a parade of horribles. The courts could find themselves involved in
detailed analyses of agency decisionmaking processes to resolve
constitutional claims.' Yet these internal decisionmaking
processes are matters that traditionally are deemed to be within
the special province and expertise of the administrative agency.16
If one accepts the premises of the due process argument, non-
acquiescence provides a relatively compelling context for applying
due process to the prehearing stages of the administrative process.
Assuming that judicial precedent controls, administrative decisions
that ignore those precedents are per se wrong. On an issue crucial
to the decision, the risk of erroneous deprivation will be 100 per-
cent. The probable value of requiring the agency to follow prece-
dent also will be 100 percent, but the probable cost of requiring
acquiescence will be limited to the cost of distributing appropriate
instructions. In addition, decisions as to what law governs adminis-
trative agencies-whether agencies must follow judicial deci-
sions-arguably do not require special expertise and appear to be
the traditional business of the courts.'63
Even if one resolves the preliminary question whether due
process safeguards apply to initial agency actions, a more serious
problem must be addressed. The due process argument is circular.
Both versions of the due process analysis simply assume that a ju-
dicial decision on an issue of law controls over a conflicting agency
interpretation. The due process analysis therefore does not stand
on its own. Rather, the analysis requires adopting either the con-
161. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1277-79 (1975).
162. See Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Liti-
gation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication
of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 772 (1974). Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
163. See the discussion of agency versus judicial expertise in Frug, The Ideology of
Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1276, 1334-50 (1984).
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trolling case doctrine or institutional competence analysis to estab-
lish the key point.
D. Separation of Powers, Institutional Competence, and
Congressional Intent
1. Separation of Powers
Administrative agencies are complex institutions. Each of the
previous doctrinal approaches to nonacquiescence proved inade-
quate because the doctrine focused on one narrow aspect of the
agency's activities-the agency as decisionmaker, the agency as
party-litigant, and the agency as government actor.
The limits of the previous approaches provide a ready frame-
work for analyzing the remaining approach to nonacquiescence and
indicate the key question to be answered: Can concepts of separa-
tion of powers help with an analysis of nonacquiescence in a way
that avoids the oversimplification that characterizes the other doc-
trinal approaches to the problem?
As a cliche of both high school civics and constitutional law
classes, "separation of powers" carries with it considerable bag-
gage. Separation of powers seems more fundamental than the doc-
trinal approaches discussed earlier, which may explain why courts
have invoked separation of powers concerns almost reflexively in
their discussions of nonacquiescence. In the purest and most fa-
mous treatment of separation of powers, Montesquieu theorized
that a properly structured government should separate the legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial branches. 6 4 Each branch of govern-
ment would exercise the power allocated to it. 165 Implicit in Mon-
tesquieu's theory is the view that each of the three branches of
government exercises different, clearly identifiable powers. Despite
the popularity of Montesquieu's views, the United States Constitu-
tion embodies a checks and balances structure rather than a pure
separation of powers approach. 66 Thus, reflexive invocation of sep-
aration of powers concepts does not readily resolve the problem of
allocation among the branches of government.
Simplistic separation of powers concepts provide little assis-
tance with administrative nonacquiescence because the Constitu-
tion does not expressly provide for administrative agencies. If
courts are to rely on separation of powers concepts, they cannot
164. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW 182 (T. Nugent trans. 1900).
165. Id. at 182-86.
166. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 336 (11th ed. 1985).
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focus readily on the constitutionally mandated or limited role of
the agencies. Instead, the courts must concentrate on the constitu-
tional role of the judiciary. Thus, we customarily find that an auto-
matic reference to Marbury v. Madison167 accompanies the separa-
tion of powers approach to nonacquiescence. Marbury often is
cited for the assertion that "[i]t is, emphatically, the province and
duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is."' 68 From
this statement courts derive the proposition that a statement by
the judiciary regarding "what the law is" must bind administrative
agencies in a way that makes nonacquiescence impermissible.
The leap from Marbury to a conclusion about nonacquies-
cence, however, is a long one. Marbury says only that in deciding a
particular case, the judiciary may refuse to enforce a statute that,
in the view of the court, violates the Constitution. Though an an-
swer may be implicit in the opinion, Marbury does not not directly
address the question whether Congress or the President must ad-
here to Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution in later
cases that raise similar issues.1 6 9 Still less does Marbury attempt to
specify whether or when administrative agencies are bound by
lower court interpretations of statutes. Further, a candid acknowl-
edgement that the separation of powers doctrine is based on a sys-
tem of checks and balances leads to the view that the problem of
controlling the respective branches of government cannot be re-
solved definitively. A simple reference to separation of powers
therefore will not suffice as a response to administrative agency
nonacquiescence.
2. Institutional Competence and Congressional Intent
An analysis based on separation of powers concerns need not
be limited to a brief reference to Marbury v. Madison. The analy-
sis can move from a general concern with separation of powers to
an attempt to delineate the particular functions best performed by
a given institution. Such a move characterizes the institutional
competence analysis favored by advocates of the "legal process"
approach to legal problems.1 0 An institutional competence analy-
167. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
168. Id. at 176.
169. Nor does Marbury address the reverse side of the problem: may the courts defer
to agency interpretations of governing statutes? That question is discussed in Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
170. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Tent ed. 1958) (available from author).
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sis would attempt to evaluate the propriety of agency nonacquies-
cence first by viewing agencies and courts as entities with distinct
areas of expertise and then by deciding whether Congress intended
the administrative agency's interpretation or a lower reviewing
court's interpretation on an issue to control subsequent agency
decisionmaking. This institutional competence approach to legal
problems has been enormously influential in both academic circles
and the judiciary over the past thirty-five years. It still retains
many adherents.17 ' Institutional competence analysis suffers from
serious weaknesses, however.
Four assumptions are implicit in institutional competence
analysis. First, under the structure of the United States Constitu-
tion, Congress appropriately controls the allocation of decision-
making between the judiciary and administrative agencies. 172 Sec-
ond, careful analysis usually will reveal congressional intent
regarding allocation of authority. Third, each institution in our
governmental scheme has unique competence in dealing with par-
ticular types of problems, but lacks the necessary competence to
handle others. Last, these areas of competence can be identified,
and the business of administrative agencies and courts should be
allocated accordingly. Neither the second nor third assumption
seems justifiable as applied to the specific circumstances of admin-
istrative agency nonacquiescence.
The structure of the Constitution and traditional concepts of
agency law form the basis for the view that Congress controls allo-
cation of decisionmaking between administrative agencies and the
judiciary. The constitutional structure does not provide expressly
for administrative agencies.1 73 Congress creates administrative
171. Current approaches to institutional competence analysis include Komesar, Tak-
ing Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U.
CH. L. REV. 366 (1984) (arguing for a comparative analysis of the capacities of institutions
before allocating issues to a particular institution).
172. There is an extensive body of scholarship on a related topic-the legitimacy of
judicial review and the proper distribution of work between the legislature and the judici-
ary. E.g., Symposium: Judicial Review Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981). Those
who favor congressional control of decisionmaking justify their preference on the ground
that our system of government is a democratic one, and Congress is the most democratic
branch of government. The ongoing dispute over the legitimacy of judicial review has at-
tacked both prongs of this justification. On the one hand, the Constitution established a
representative form of government, not a pure democracy. Arguably, furthering democracy
is not the relevant criterion for determining the proper decisionmaker. Alternatively, even if
democratic decisionmaking should be furthered, Congress may not be significantly more
representative than other branches of government. See Parker, The Past of Constitutional
Theory-and Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981).
173. Article II, §§ 2 and 3 do contemplate heads of departments (and presumably de-
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agencies and thereby controls the extent of their jurisdiction.
Under the traditional view, administrative agency power is
founded on a delegation of power by the legislature. 7  That is,
Congress delegates to an administrative agency its Article I author-
ity to legislate; from this delegation the agency derives its author-
ity to engage in rulemaking. This analysis does not explain how the
agency derives its authority to engage in adjudication, which is the
activity giving rise to nonacquiescence. Other constitutional provi-
sions do provide some assistance with that question. Under the
constitutional structure, Congress has extensive authority over ju-
risdiction of the federal courts. 175 In addition, Congress has the au-
thority under the necessary and proper clause to establish special,
non-Article III courts and presumably to establish administrative
agencies to adjudicate. 17  Furthermore, Congress apparently has
the authority to make administrative agencies the exclusive deci-
sionmakers, even on issues of law, by precluding judicial review of
agency decisions.177
Establishing that Congress has the authority to allocate deci-
sionmaking between agency and court does not resolve the prob-
lem of nonacquiescence unless Congress actually has allocated such
authority. 17 The assumption that courts ordinarily can determine
which institution Congress intended to resolve a particular issue
has spawned extensive commentary. A large and complicated doc-
trine has evolved that sets out the considerations appropriate for
partments under them), as well as officers of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
Article I, § 8 refers to post offices and Article I, § 6 to the Treasury of the United States.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 8.
174. For a summary of the traditional view see Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1671-76 (1975).
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; art. I1, § 1.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Cases upholding Congress' authority to establish "legisla-
tive" courts include Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929) (Court of Customs and
Patents Appeals) and Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 636 (5th Cir.)
(Tax Court), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966).
177. See Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1936). The court stated in
dictum that "[t]he United States is not, by the creation of claims against itself, bound to
provide a remedy in the courts. It may withhold all remedy or it may provide an administra-
tive remedy and make it exclusive." Id. at 171-72. Note that the current expansive reading
of the due process clause undermines the rationale for Dismuke. See also United States v.
Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
178. In cases involving administrative agency nonacquiescence, neither decisionmaking
by the agency nor by the courts is particularly democratic. By showing that Congress in-
tended it to make the decision, however, either institution may claim that it is "closer to
God" (i.e., democracy) and thus is the more appropriate decisionmaker.
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evaluating congressional intent on such questions.179
Attacks on courts' ability to locate Congress' intent operate on
varying levels. 180 The most telling attack questions whether the
concept of congressional intent has meaning. Even individuals de-
sire to effectuate a variety of goals, many of which are inconsistent.
A singular intent for an individual often will be lacking. To speak
of Congress' intent is even more complicated. Congress is a group
composed of many individuals who individually experience internal
conflict and who disagree with each other. To identify a congres-
sional intent, the analyst must create an abstraction by disregard-
ing the intention of some members of Congress while crediting
others. Even if he or she concludes that Congress on some occa-
sions may have intended certain results, the analyst still faces diffi-
culties discerning a congressional intent in particular cases. In
some instances, problems will arise that few or no members of
Congress anticipated. Congressional intent in these circumstances
is strictly a fiction, and any analysis results in speculation regard-
ing what most members of Congress would have thought about the
subject had they considered it. In other instances, the legislative
history may demonstrate that many members of Congress consid-
ered a problem. Yet that history may fail to demonstrate that Con-
gress resolved the issue explicitly because the art of compromise
sometimes consists of the ability of conflicting parties to stick their
heads in the proverbial sand.
The problem of discerning Congress' intent regarding adminis-
trative agency nonacquiescence can be approached from two direc-
tions: (1) which institution did Congress intend should resolve the
underlying issue initially? and (2) which institution's decision did
Congress intend should control in the event that the agency and
the court continued to disagree after each institution expressed its
view?
Until recently Congress apparently had not considered explic-
itly the problem of administrative agency nonacquiescence, either
generally or with respect to particular agencies. Statutes governing
judicial review of agency decisions, therefore, do not address the
179. See, e.g., Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 31 AD. L. REv. 329 (1979). See generally Abrams, The Place of Procedural
Control in Determining Who May Sue or Be Sued: Lessons in Statutory Interpretation
from Civil RICO and Sedima, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1477 (1985).
180. See, e.g., T. Lowi, supra note 85, at 307-09; R. MELMCK, supra note 78, at 373-75.




precedential effect of the court's decisions.' 8 ' Thus, an attempt to
resolve the problem of nonacquiescence by relying on Congress' in-
tent faces immediate difficulties. Neither language nor legislative
history assists in the effort.
The problem of administrative agency nonacquiescence, how-
ever, did generate congressional attention in the context of the
SSA's recent program for reviewing the continuing eligibility of re-
cipients of SSA disability benefits. These CDI reviews resulted in
large numbers of individuals losing their benefits in part because
the agency ignored several judicial precedents. 82 In response, Con-
gress considered two proposals. One proposal altered the substan-
tive law over which the SSA and the courts disagreed; 183 the other
specified the agency's obligation to abide by judicial precedent. 84
To date Congress has coped with the SSA's nonacquiescence by
resolving the substantive issue-in this case by amending the So-
cial Security Act to require that the SSA demonstrate medical im-
provement before terminating a claimant's benefits. 8 5 In effect,
Congress sided with the judiciary rather than with the agency on
the issue that generated the nonacquiescence ruling. Faced with
proposals to limit nonacquiescence, 88 however, Congress carefully
sidestepped the problem. House and Senate conferees refused to
require the SSA to follow circuit court decisions in subsequent
cases arising within the circuit. At the same time, the conferees
included language in their conference report that expressed con-
cern about the constitutionality of nonacquiescence and urged the
SSA to obtain Supreme Court review of the practice. 87 To the ex-
tent that one can infer any congressional intent as to nonacquies-
cence, therefore, it appears that Congress intends to avoid passing
judgment on the issue.
In the absence of the traditional indicia of congressional intent
181. See, e.g, 15 U.S.C. §§ 21, 45; 29 U.S.C. § 160; 42 U.S.C. § 405 (1982).
182. See Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1433-34 (9th Cir. 1983).
183. Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98
Stat. 1794 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, 1381).
184. See H.R. 3755, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 302, 130 CONG. REc. 1990-91 (1984). This
House proposal would have required intracircuit acquiescence unless the agency obtained
review by the Supreme Court. Cf. S. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7, 130 CONG. REc. 6204
(1984). The Senate bill simply would have required the SSA to publish in the Federal Regis-
ter a statement of reasons for acquiescence or nonacquiescence and to forward that informa-
tion to Congress.
185. See supra note 183.
186. See supra note 184.
187. H.R. REP. No. 1034, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3038, 3096.
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as to the propriety of nonacquiescence, a decisionmaker could at-
tempt a slightly different institutional competence analysis. He or
she could sanction nonacquiescence to the extent that Congress in-
tended the agency rather than the courts to resolve the underlying
substantive issue and prohibit nonacquiescence to the extent that
Congress intended the courts to resolve the issue.
The agency statutes and legislative history available for deter-
mining Congress' intent inevitably are characterized by a certain
schizophrenia, however. That Congress established an administra-
tive agency to handle a matter, rather than delegating authority to
the judiciary, suggests that members of Congress were relying on
the agency to make decisions on administrative matters. Yet Con-
gress' provision for judicial review of agency decisions suggests that
Congress intended the courts to have the final word on some issues
in individual cases. This recurrent tension is visible in efforts to
define congressional intent and is reflected in the courts' decisions
on the scope of judicial review of agency decisions. The judiciary
fluctuates between deferring to the agency as decisionmaker and
asserting that the courts properly decide questions raised on judi-
cial review.18 A reference to congressional intent can justify either
approach.
A solution to the problem of conflicting congressional intent
may be found if decisionmakers can identify distinct areas of com-
petence for the agency and the reviewing court. The third assump-
tion characterizing institutional competence analysis suggests this
solution. Both the administrative agency and the judiciary can
claim that a topic on which the agency has engaged in nonacquies-
cence lies within the institution's specific expertise and compe-
tence. The court can rely on its special expertise in interpreting
statutes and resolving issues of law. The agency can counter by
noting its familiarity with the particular statute at issue and with
the way in which the statute operates in practice. Neither claim
can be peremptorily dismissed.
We lack a method for resolving conflicting claims of compe-
tence because our limits on such claims operate in a circular fash-
ion. As Professor Frug has noted, each institution defines its area
of competence as limited only by standards of expertise that ex-
perts must define, that is, those experts identified with the institu-
188. See S. BREYER & R. STEwART ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 185-
373 (2d ed. 1985); Frug, supra note 163, at 1337-45.
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tion itself.189 Thus, just as only the agency and its personnel prop-
erly can define the limits of agency expertise, only judges and
lawyers properly can define the limits of judicial expertise. Yet
nonacquiescence occurs because the boundaries of judicial and
agency expertise conflict. A court does not defer to the views of an
agency in resolving an issue presumably because the judge believes
that the issue falls within the competence of the judiciary. The
agency is unwilling to defer to the court by following the court's
contrary resolution of an issue presumably because the agency be-
lieves that the issue falls within the scope of agency expertise as
defined by institutional competence.
E. Summary
This section has discussed four doctrinal solutions to nonac-
quiescence that litigants and the judiciary have argued. None of
these doctrines legitimize administrative agency nonacquiescence,
yet none suggests satisfactory limits to the problem. Of the four
doctrines considered, due process may be discarded because it nec-
essarily assumes the applicability of one of the other arguments.
Issue preclusion fails to solve the nonacquiescence problem be-
cause nonacquiescence falls readily within exceptions to the doc-
trine. Stare decisis concepts might provide limited solutions to the
nonacquiescence problem, but the bulk of agency busi-
ness-informal agency action-is not governed readily by stare de-
cisis and thus falls outside its scope. Separation of powers concerns
seem to be a powerful way to approach nonacquiescence. Yet ap-
plication of the separation of powers doctrine is undercut by the
absence of a neutral vantage point for applying those concepts. In
engaging in separation of powers analysis, the decisionmaker nec-
essarily must adopt the perspective either of the agency or of the
court.
V. ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES To NONACQUIESCENCE
The question whether nonacquiescence is legitimate or desira-
ble can be resolved at a theoretical level only by reference to a
prior choice between conflicting values. The decisionmaker must
choose between the perspective of the agency and that of the
courts, between rule of law values and bureaucratic values. That
value conflict pervades administrative law. Because the conflict has
189. See Frug, supra note 163, at 1337-38.
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not been resolved in other contexts, it is unlikely to be resolved
generally or permanently in the context of nonacquiescence.
Nonetheless, both litigants and decisionmakers-agencies, the
judiciary, and Congress-must develop a practical response to non-
acquiescence, even if the response is simply to ignore the prob-
lem.19 0 The possible responses fall into four basic categories. The
judiciary could decide whether or to what extent agencies are
bound by judicial precedent. 191 Alternatively, Congress could inter-
vene to resolve the question. 195 Absent external direction, adminis-
trative agencies currently engaging in nonacquiescence could de-
cide voluntarily to follow judicial precedent in specified
circumstances.19 3 Finally, litigants and any of the three potential
decisionmakers could ignore the question whether nonacquiescence
itself is permissible and could focus their attention on prompt res-
olution of the substantive issues triggering agency-court disagree-
ments.1 94 In choosing among these options, litigants and deci-
sionmakers should take into account certain practical concerns.
A. Likelihood of Obtaining the Response
A primary concern for litigants will be the search for a deci-
sionmaker who can and will respond in a satisfactory fashion. Each
of the available options has advantages and disadvantages in that
regard. Absent a satisfactory doctrinal analysis for nonacquies-
cence, the judiciary seems unlikely to decide the issue definitively.
Even the judiciary has not resolved uniformly the underlying value
conflict between rule of law and bureaucratic values. Although the
courts initially responded to nonacquiescence by adopting the judi-
cial perspective, more recently the courts have waffled when faced
with direct challenges to the practice. 95 Because substantial judi-
cial sympathy exists for deference to agency decisions,1 96 litigation
190. The appoach of ignoring the problem has been referred to as the Moscow option.
Moscow was an Under Secretary of the Labor Department in the Ford Administration. In
his option papers to the Executive he invariably suggested doing nothing about the problem.
See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LEGISLATIVE VETO OF AGENCY
RULES AFTER INS v. Chadha 28-29 (1983) (statement of Antonin Scalia).
191. See cases cited supra note 55.
192. See proposals cited supra note 184.
193. See infra note 199.
194. See, e.g., Siedlecki v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Wash. 1983); Morrison v.
Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
195. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 54.
196. See, e.g., Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Wright, J., concurring).
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is likely to be protracted and the ultimate outcome in doubt.
Although Congress does not require a doctrinal framework for
addressing nonacquiescence, legislators would have to resolve the
underlying value conflict to adopt general limits on nonacquies-
cence. In its response to proposed limits on SSA nonacquiescence,
Congress has already demonstrated its reluctance to make that
choice.19" Additional factors may reinforce this position. Because
informal nonacquiescence operates at a submerged level, the true
extent of the problem remains murky. Some reason exists for be-
lieving that the current uproar over nonacquiescence is in part a
product of unique historical circumstances. 98 Thus, both Congress
197. See supra note 184.
198. The IRS and the NLRB have engaged in nonacquiescence for decades. Although
those agencies' practices have been attacked in law journals, litigants against the NLRB and
the IRS have not pursued the issue in the courts. The recent direct attacks involving the
SSA probably can be attributed to two factors. Litigants faced with agency nonacquiescence
can appeal the agency decision on its merits or they can attack the agency's nonacquies-
cence. If the litigant's position on the merits is strong, an appeal is easier. The litigant and
the court can address the case on the comparatively narrow question of statutory interpreta-
tion, rather than struggling with the broad and complicated issues involved in nonacquies-
cence. A court faced with both questions thus is likely to resolve the issue on the merits.
The individual litigant may be reluctant to attack only the agency's practice of nonacquies-
cence, apart from the merits of the agency's decision. Such an approach implicitly might
concede that the agency's substantive position is correct and thereby would remove much of
the reviewing court's incentive to find the nonacquiescence impermissible.
Additionally, the structure of traditional litigation provides little incentive for the liti-
gant to challenge nonacquiescence. Most individual litigants will not encounter again the
issue on which the agency refused to follow precedent. If the issue might arise again because
the litigant regularly encounters the administrative agency, collateral estoppel may provide
a measure of protection. In any event, as long as the litigant has the resources to obtain a
lawyer and challenge future agency action, a broadside attack on nonacquiescence will seem
either unnecessary or unlikely to be cost effective.
Recent attacks on nonacquiescence, however, have grown out of a very different litiga-
tion setting. These attacks, which challenge nonacquiescence by the SSA, were part of a
response to SSA actions in its review of the continuing eligibility of large numbers of social
security and SSI disability recipients. See supra note 56.
As a result of the CDI reviews, legal services attorneys and other advocates for indi-
gents were overwhelmed with requests for assistance by disability recipients seeking to re-
tain their benefits. Explanations for agency actions that were mailed to claimants often sug-
gested widespread state agency disregard of disability criteria imposed by judicial
interpretation of the Social Security Act, including disregard of decisions imposing on the
agency the burden of showing that the claimant's medical condition had improved.
This large influx of cases occurred during a period of limited and sharply declining
availability of legal representation for the poor. Thus, lawyers faced with disability termina-
tion cases had considerable incentive to prevent the terminations or to attack them on a
class-wide basis. The attorneys otherwise would be faced with too many individual cases to
handle. The individual cases, all raising similar legal issues, were winnable ultimately on the
merits if the attorneys invested substantial time in making a record at the ALJ hearing
level, exhausting agency appeals, and obtaining federal district court review. No easy basis
existed for deciding which individual claims to handle. Even if the demand for representa-
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and the judiciary may prefer to respond to the problem in limited
fashion, perhaps by focusing on the particular agencies whose prac-
tices are under attack.
At first glance, the strategy of obtaining voluntary limits on
nonacquiescence through the agency does not seem promising be-
cause that approach requires the agency to concede voluntarily the
prerogatives it currently claims. Substantial external pressure,
however, may in fact lead to agency concessions on the issue.199
These concessions are likely to be limited in nature unless the
agency is widely imbued with rule of law values, or agency person-
nel believe that the access to Congress on substantive issues will
result ultimately in victory for agency views.2 0
Responses to nonacquiescence need not be limited to attempts
to resolve the procedural question of who decides-agency or
court. An alternative approach is to obtain a definitive resolution
of the underlying issue that created the dispute, either by shifting
the decisionmaking to Congress or the Supreme Court, or by
adopting a procedure such as the class action, which concededly
binds the agency on a larger scale. Until recently, litigants consist-
ently have addressed the substantive issue rather than attack the
practice of nonacquiescence itself. 0 1 It is unclear whether that
problem was due to a lack of awareness that the agency was engag-
tion could be met, handling cases on an individual basis was not wholly satisfactory. Those
claimants represented by attorneys would do without disability benefits from the time of the
unfavorable agency hearing decision until the judicial vindication. The stakes involved in
avoiding the initial terminations-claimants' health, means of support, and even lives-were
obviously high.
199. In response to public uproar, adverse press, and repeated attacks on SSA nonac-
quiescence in the courts, the SSA announced that it would modify its policy on nonacquies-
cence. Department of Health and Human Services Press Release (June 3, 1984).
200. For example, the changes in SSA policy, announced with considerable fanfare, are
in fact extremely limited. The SSA apparently will follow judicial precedent only partially
and only at the formal adjudicatory hearing stage. If the ALJ must follow judicial precedent
from within the circuit in order to award benefits, the ALJ will write a recommended deci-
sion and will refer the case to the Appeals Council. That body will award benefits unless,
after consulting with counsel, it decides that the case would make a good test case for seek-
ing reversal of the applicable precedent. Thus, the new policy will not affect the bulk of
agency decisionmaking. As to those claimants for benefits who actually can seek review of
initial agency determinations, the result may be long delays in obtaining payment. See Of-
ice of Hearings and Appeals Interim Circular No. 185; National Senior Citizens Law Center
Informational Mailing #85-8 (June 4, 1985). The limited nature of these changes in SSA
policy is discussed in Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1367-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The
SSA apparently justified its limited acquiescence policy on the grounds that (1) 90% of
claimants terminated under the CDI program appealed to the ALJ level; and (2) low level
agency personnel lacked the necessary legal training to apply court precedents.
201. See supra note 198.
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ing in nonacquiescence or due to a conscious strategy.
Because this strategy of concentrating on the underlying issue
has potential advantages, it has not been displaced completely by
recent direct attacks on nonacquiescence 202 Mounting a judicial
challenge to nonacquiescence potentially requires substantial re-
sources because the litigant must address novel and complex issues
of law. Yet, as is often true with procedural litigation, these law-
suits are likely to be protracted efforts, which may take years
before they reach a final resolution. By contrast, a lawsuit focused
on the underlying dispute deals with a comparatively narrow issue
that already has been resolved at least once in favor of the litigant.
Therefore, a litigant may have more success in obtaining a
favorable response from the court in a narrowly drawn challenge.
The usefulness of this approach in affecting agency decisionmaking
depends on the availability of a class action procedure to cover all
persons affected by agency refusal to follow precedent. To the ex-
tent that courts create jurisdictional and other barriers that limit
the coverage of lawsuits focusing on the substantive issues,20 3 liti-
gants may prefer direct attacks on nonacquiescence in order to af-
fect agency action in cases that are not appealed. Rules that re-
quire exhaustion of administrative remedies may make this a
serious problem in nonacquiescence-related litigation. °4
B. The Context of Nonacquiescence: Agency Function and
Structure
Administrative agencies differ substantially in function and
structure. The effects of nonacquiescence vary accordingly. Key
202. See, e.g., Morrison v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Wash. 1983). Many of the
cases challenging SSA nonacquiescence seem to combine both strategies. Typically, those
cases have challenged SSA failure to follow judicial precedent in specific instances, and in-
junctive relief has been framed in terms of specific issues, rather than the SSA's duty to
follow precedent generally.
203. In social security litigation, for instance, claimants must show that each class
member satisfies the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982), as interpreted by Wein-
berger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1975). Under Salfi, the statute imposes a nonwaivable,
jurisdictional requirement that each claimant must have presented a claim to the Secretary.
Additionally, each plaintiff must have exhausted the agency's prescribed administrative re-
view procedures, but this element may be waived by the Secretary either expressly or im-
pliedly. Some courts also have refused to certify class actions against the government on the
ground that such actions are unnecessary because the government will apply the court's
ruling to other cases, see 4 H. NEWBURG, NEWBURG ON CLASs AcTIO 215 n.72 (2d ed. 1985),
a patently unwarranted assumption in light of the data on nonacquiescence.
204. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Schweiker, 547 F. Supp. 599 (D. Vt. 1982), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, sub noma. Wheeler v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1983); Smith v. Schweiker,
709 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1983).
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parameters in evaluating the problem include: (1) whether the
agency handles primarily agency versus single party disputes in
which nonacquiescence consistently will disfavor the party oppos-
ing the agency, or multiparty disputes in which nonacquiescence
can favor opposing interests according to the circumstances; (2)
whether the disfavored party generally will have the resources to
obtain judicial review in the event of nonacquiescence; (3) the ex-
tent to which the agency and opposing parties have ready access to
Congress for resolution of the underlying dispute; and (4) the ex-
tent to which parties may suffer irreparable harm because of de-
lays in resolving the underlying issue.
For example, nonacquiescence by the SSA almost invariably
disfavors persons who seek benefits under programs administered
by the agency.20° As a class, the individuals affected by nonacquies-
cence tend to be poor, ill-educated, and likely to suffer from
mental or physical illness. 0 They often lack legal representation.
As a consequence, many persons affected by nonacquiescence will
fail to seek judicial review despite the serious consequences of fail-
ing to appeal and their almost certain success if they were to seek
review. Thus, the problem of nonacquiescence is readily painted as
a practice that pits defenseless individuals against a large and pow-
erful bureaucracy. Because lawyers representing members of that
group have a special interest in challenging nonacquiescence, °7 the
problem is unlikely to fade away. In addition, class members in
many instances may have comparatively restricted access to Con-
gress for purposes of resolving the underlying substantive issues.208
205. See supra note 75.
206. See, e.g. Lando, The Interaction Between Health and Education, 38 Soc. SEC.
BULL. Dec. 1975, at 16; Levy, Demographic Factors in the Disability Determination Pro-
cess: A Logistic Approach, 73 Soc. SEcumnT BULL. Mar. 1980, at 11.
207. Additional factors may encourage attorneys representing social security or SSI
claimants to challenge agency nonacquiescence. Individuals initially seeking benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982), can often obtain legal repre-
sentation on a contingent fee basis. The attorney's fee is paid from retroactive benefits pay-
able for a period of up to one year before the date of application. In most cases private
representation will not be available to persons seeking benefits under Title XVII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1393-1394 (1982), a need-based welfare program administered by the SSA. Benefits are
payable only from the date of application, or to current recipients who are threatened with
termination of their benefits, because no comparable fund of retroactive benefits exists. In
such cases, legal representation, if at all available, is likely to come from legal services pro-
grams. Many of those programs train their staffs to seek class-wide solutions to problems in
order to provide cost effective legal representation. Recent severe funding cutbacks may
encourage that approach, although funding cutbacks have been accompanied by efforts to
restrict the use of class actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(5) (1982).
208. Restrictions under the Legal Services Corporation Act limit use of federal funds
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Decisionmakers, therefore, may choose to limit nonacquiescence
because requiring the agency to follow judicial precedent, at least
within the circuit of issue, places the burden of resorting to Con-
gress to resolve the underlying substantive issues on the agency
rather than on affected individuals. 09 Such an approach will be
truly significant, however, only if the direction to follow precedent
reaches the informal decisionmaking process of the agency, and not
merely the formal adjudicatory process. 2 10
Nonacquiescence by the NLRB, by contrast, takes place in a
multiparty context. The practice will have a consistent substantive
effect of favoring unions or management only if the NLRB and the
judiciary have consistent and opposing predilections. Many,
though certainly not all, of the affected unions and employees will
have substantial resources for obtaining judicial relief or for ap-
proaching Congress on the merits of underlying issues. Thus, all
parties affected by NLRB nonacquiescence benefit from the prac-
tice on occasion, and the need for resolution of the issue may seem
less pressing than in the case of the SSA.
C. Enforcement
The usefulness of any of the available responses to nonacqui-
escence will depend both on the agency response-will the agency
voluntarily comply with externally imposed limits to nonacquies-
cence?-and on enforcement mechanisms available in the event of
noncompliance.
1. Voluntary Compliance
To the extent that Congress or the judiciary imposes limits on
administrative agency nonacquiescence, agencies are likely to
abandon most formal nonacquiescence that obviously is inconsis-
tent with those limits. Only an agency that actively seeks conflict
with the other branches of government could be expected inten-
tionally to alert Congress or the judiciary to agency noncompli-
for lobbying by legal services programs. 29 U.S.C. § 2996e(c) (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 1612 (1985).
Low income groups can be successful before Congress when more powerful interests support
their goals, as evidenced by the congressional response to the Continuing Disability Investi-
gation program described supra note 56. Mental health professionals mobilized on behalf of
their clients and joined forces with state officials, who saw the cost of supporting the indi-
viduals terminated in the CDI reviews shift from the federal government to the state gov-
ernments. See Wyrick & Owens, supra note 56.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 115-21.
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ance. Thus, the significant test of an attempt to limit nonacquies-
cence will appear in the area of informal nonacquiescence because
an agency often can disregard a requirement that it follow prece-
dent by distinguishing or ignoring applicable judicial decisions.
A successful response to nonacquiescence will be one that in-
duces the maximum voluntary compliance by administrative agen-
cies. Which institution sets the limits on nonacquiescence may af-
fect voluntary agency compliance. An agency that is subject to
close and continuing oversight by Congress, but a relatively limited
incidence of judicial supervision, may comply more readily with a
congressional response to the problem than with judicially imposed
limits. If voluntarily adopted agency limits on nonacquiescence are
real, and not mere window dressing, agency limits have obvious ad-
vantages in inducing voluntary compliance.
Additionally, voluntary compliance may be affected by the ex-
tent to which limits on nonacquiescence acknowledge and respond
sensitively to legitimate agency concerns. For instance, imposing
on the SSA a requirement that it follow district court precedent
seems to be universally acknowledged as unworkable, though in
some respects such a requirement is consistent with attempted
doctrinal resolutions of the problem. Similarly, any attempt to
limit nonacquiescence by the NLRB, the FTC, or the IRS should
resolve the difficulties that arise from multiple venue options for
judicial review. 211
2. Remedies and Sanctions
The traditional remedy for illegal agency behavior is judicial
review of individual agency decisions. 212 That remedy would be
available in the event of agency failure to comply with externally
imposed limits on nonacquiescence. The courts could reverse sum-
marily all individual agency decisions in which the agency refused
to follow judicial precedent. This remedy would add little to ex-
isting options, however, because a court now can reverse agency
decisions summarily based on its view of the merits of the underly-
ing issues. The courts will not necessarily alter agency nonacquies-
cence practices by consistently reversing those agency decisions
that come before the court on judicial review. 213 In the case of in-
ternal agency-imposed limits on nonacquiescence, agency viola-
211. See supra note 73.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44.
213. See, e.g., the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982).
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tions would be subject to sanction or judicial review only if those
limits were treated as having the force of law. Thus, absent pro-
mulgation of the limits as binding rules under the Administrative
Procedure Act, compliance might depend completely on agency
goodwill.2 14
The other major judicial remedy for agency noncompliance is
the action for declaratory and injunctive relief. 215 Some agencies
may choose to ignore limits on nonacquiescence even when the
courts specifically order them to follow such limits. If agencies be-
have in this fashion, declaratory and injunctive relief will have no
force unless a court can impose sanctions for violation of previ-
ously ordered relief. The traditional penalty for violation of an in-
junction is the contempt proceeding, which can result in imprison-
ment of the offending party.1 6 The dispersion of authority within
an agency, however, makes imposition of contempt sanctions awk-
ward.211 Few judges will be comfortable with the prospect of im-
prisoning members of an independent agency, much less a cabinet
level department head. Yet imposing contempt sanctions on low
level officials may seem unfair because of the limited authority ex-
ercised by an individual within the bureaucracy. Additionally, the
task of identifying and sanctioning agency noncompliance may be
complicated because of difficulty in determining the actual agency
practice.218
214. Cf. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981). The Hansen Court refused to estop
the SSA from relying on a requirement that a claimant file a written application to meet
applicable time limitations. The SSA claims representative who handled the claimant's oral
inquiry regarding eligibility failed to advise the claimant to file a written application, de-
spite explicit internal agency operating instructions to do so.
215. Actions for declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and for injunctive relief
have taken on added significance in light of the removal of the amount in controversy re-
quirements for federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), as amended by Pub. L.
No. 96-406, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980).
216. See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183
(1971) (critical survey of basic concepts central to an understanding of contempt power and
suggestions for legislative restructuring to avoid extreme results).
217. As a result, the courts tend to be very reluctant to impose contempt sanctions on
agency heads. See, e.g., Morrison v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (denying
plaintiffs' request for contempt sanctions, despite a finding that the agency had failed to
comply with the court's earlier order).
218. In Morrison v. Heckler, for instance, the agency filed a Brief in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or for Preliminary Injunction, in which
agency attorneys asserted that the agency's regulations and practices are in accordance with
the requirements set out in Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1975). 582 F. Supp.
at 323. SSA Program Circular No. 13-85, issued by the Region X SSA office and dated June
14, 1985, however, stated that Day "was not a class action suit. SSA did not acquiesce in the
court's decision." Id. at 3.
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A third remedy for illegal agency action is the action for dam-
ages from individual agency personnel based on an implied right of
action under the Constitution. Absent a definitive judicial ruling
that nonacquiescence is unconstitutional, such actions are likely to
founder on the doctrine of official immunity.2 19
In recent years an additional tool has been added to the tradi-
tional remedies for agency noncompliance with judicial precedent:
imposition of attorney's fees against the agency 220 or the attor-
ney22' when the agency's position was not justified. If the underly-
ing issues concerning legality of nonacquiescence are resolved
against the agency, the threat of an attorney's fee award may have
some deterrent effect. The impact of the threat, however, may de-
pend somewhat on the nature of the agency budget process and on
the relationship of the agency to those who represent the agency in
court.
Congressional remedies through oversight proceedings or in-
formal pressures do not have to struggle with the doctrinal limits
imposed on contempt proceedings. With congressional remedies,
the ability to identify noncompliance with established limits on
nonacquiescence will be crucial to enforcement efforts.
Attempts to circumvent these problems by focusing on under-
lying substantive issues will not be problem free. In those cases,
the difficulty descends to a more specific level-that of identifying
substantive requirements and agency practices regarding compli-
ance with those requirements. These potential enforcement
problems reinforce both the desirability of obtaining voluntary
compliance with limits on nonacquiescence and the need for care-
ful attention initially to the structure of any such limits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Administrative agency nonacquiescence is a widespread prac-
tice in the American governmental system. Nonacquiescence is a
problem with substantial impact on litigants and important impli-
cations for allocation of power in American government, but is one
that is not readily susceptible to permanent or value-neutral solu-
tions. Therefore, increased knowledge of the problem brings power,
but is not a panacea. A greater awareness and a deeper under-
219. Chilieky v. Schweiker, 55 U.S.L.W. 1033 (9th Cir. August 12, 1986) (in action for
damages against Secretary of HHS and officials based on nonacquiescence policy, official
entitled to immunity).
220. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980).
221. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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standing of the phenomenon of nonacquiescence may not lead to a
consensus on its legitimacy. Such knowledge, however, may help
participants in the system recognize the problem when it arises
and may assist researchers in identifying the pervasiveness of the
practice. More importantly, that knowledge may focus the atten-
tion of decisionmakers on the real costs of nonacquiescence and
may encourage litigants to choose intelligently among the options
for addressing the problem, recognizing that their choices simply
will be the prelude to an ongoing struggle.
